VOL. XVII

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-vs-

10-CR-219S

TONAWANDA COKE CORPORATION MARK L. KAMHOLZ,

Defendants.

Proceedings held before the

Honorable William M. Skretny, U.S.

Courthouse, 2 Niagara Circle, Buffalo,

New York on March 25, 2013.

APPEARANCES:

AARON J. MANGO, Assistant United States Attorney, ROCKY PIAGGIONE, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Appearing for the United States.

GREGORY F. LINSIN, ESQ.,
JEANNE M. GRASSO, ESQ.,
ARIEL S. GLASNER, ESQ.,
Appearing for Tonawanda Coke Corporation.

RODNEY PERSONIUS, ESQ., Appearing for Mark L. Kamholz.

Also Present: Lauren DiFillipo, Paralegal Sheila Henderson, Paralegal

Michelle L. McLaughlin, RPR, Official Reporter, U.S.D.C. W.D.N.Y. (716)332-3560

Case 1:10-cr-00219-WMS-HKS	Document 332	Filed 10/10/14	Page 2 of 208
			3592

		3592
1	INDEX	
2	WITNESS	PAGE
3	MICHAEL IANNELLO Direct Examination by Mr. Personius	3616
4	Cross-Examination by Mr. Mango Redirect Examination by Mr. Personius	3647 3657
5	Recross-Examination by Mr. Mango	3680
6	PHILIP FLAX Direct Examination by Mr. Mango	3680
7	Cross-Examination by Mr. Linsin Redirect Examination by Mr. Mango	3701 3721
8	JURY CHARGE CONFERENCE	3743
9	JURY CHARGE	3756
10		
11		
12	DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS	EVD.
13	SSSS 0000	3630 3685
14		
15	GOVERNMENT EXHIBITS	EVD.
16	48 212	3641 3688
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

(Jury not present in the courtroom.)

THE COURT: If we could get Tonawanda

Coke, please.

Is there anything preliminary we have to do?

MR. MANGO: May I consult with counsel for one moment before I answer that question?

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm going to take 15 anyway right now. The jury's not here yet, so that'll -- I'm sorry?

MR. LINSIN: The only issue I was going to raise potentially, Mr. Iannello is our first and last witness this morning. Before we then rested I wanted to resolve this issue of the chart that we had offered in connection with Miss Williams' testimony.

Over the weekend the government provided a chart they expect to utilize with -- I believe with -- in connection with Mr. Flax's rebuttal testimony today. And I can represent, at least on behalf of Tonawanda Coke, we -- we would not oppose the admission of that chart. I wasn't sure if the government was intending to offer it, but I thought it might be helpful to clarify that before the Court considered this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you know -- have you

seen it and reviewed it?

MR. MANGO: Oh, yes, Judge. We've worked on this chart this weekend, and this is the chart we provided to defense for our rebuttal witness.

THE COURT: Well, there's no objection to that chart, right?

MR. LINSIN: Well --

THE COURT: Or is it contingent upon --

MR. LINSIN: -- my hope in making this suggestion was that if the government was not going to oppose ours, then we would not oppose theirs.

Yes. If that seems to be a reasonable quid proquo.

THE COURT: Well, have you had made any adjustments --

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, we have. And I would be happy to offer the adjustments that we have made for the Court's review. We believe we addressed the issues, at least as we understood them, in connection with comments the Court had made. I've not shown this revised version to government counsel, but would be happy to do so.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that. We'll take 15 minutes, and then the government made a submission yesterday, I think --

1 or, no, that was your submission yesterday with 2 respect to the chart. 3 MR. LINSIN: We made a submission, your 4 Honor, in connection with the jury charge issues, 5 yes. 6 THE COURT: Okay. We'll see you in about 7 15, and then we'll see where the jury is at this 8 point. Thank you. 9 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. 10 (Short recess was taken.) 11 (Jury not present in the courtroom.) 12 THE COURT: Okay. Miss Labuzzetta, if you 13 would call the case, please. 14 THE CLERK: Criminal case 10-219, United 15 States of America versus Tonawanda Coke and Mark 16 Kamholz. 17 THE COURT: Okay. The attorneys and 18 parties are all present, and the jury is here. 19 do have to resolve the matter of Ms. Majerowski's 20 availability, and so we'll do that today. 21 As far as the matter of the chart, Mr. Linsin, 22 if you want to bring that up at this point, we'll 23 deal with it. 24 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor.

Sheila, if you could call up, so the Judge

could review it, Defendant's Exhibit 0000 as modified.

And if I may, your Honor, explain that consistent with Miss Williams' testimony and more completely consistent with Miss Williams' testimony, we have made the following modifications to the chart that was displayed during her testimony last week.

We have added a negative arrow descending from the 261.4(a) exemption box to indicate that if the material or its handling does not meet that exemption, that it is — the analysis must be returned to the hazardous waste box, the purple box.

We have added below that purple box the indication that if, in fact, the material meets one of the definitions of a hazardous waste, then a permit is required for either storage or disposal. We did not include treatment, because that is not one of the alleged violations in the case.

And then on the left-hand side of the chart we have added the parenthetical clause below the "not a RCRA waste" box, which states that these are examples of materials, slash, activities that do not meet the definition of solid waste.

And we have retained here, your Honor, only those examples that Miss Williams testified as, in her opinion, being relevant to her analysis for the management of the activities in question here. As the Court may recall, there had been other examples in the original chart, and we thought it would be clearer, more faithful to her testimony, to simply have those listed that were, in fact, referenced by her as examples.

So we have modified the chart in a way that we believe more fully comports with and is faithful to her testimony. As the Court may recall, we -- we moved this exhibit during her testimony, and the Court reserved judgment, as I recall. We have had discussions with counsel during the break, and unfortunately -- I will let Mr. Mango speak, but my understanding is the government will continue to oppose receipt of this exhibit.

THE COURT: Okay. And we -- and I was in agreement with this, that this cannot be admitted under 1006.

Let me ask you this. You know -- and why do we have those light rays on the left side of the chart? Can that be --

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, my understanding,

I believe this is simply the chosen background. We would be happy, obviously, to make this -- the background completely neutral and consistent. I'm confident that could be easily resolved, your Honor. Honestly, I had not even noticed it. But I believe it's just a template that was selected and was not meant to influence or be anything substantive.

THE COURT: All right. Because I think it makes it more difficult. It doesn't come out as pronounced, to read, and I think that's problematic. It was the same on the other draft. So I'll ask you to take a look at that, if I do admit it, and make it entirely a neutral background.

MR. LINSIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And there will be more definition that way, I think.

Mr. Mango, the government objects?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. The government does intend, and we've provided now up to the Court -- we can pull it up on the screen, as well, if you would like to see the summary chart the government is going to use during our rebuttal case if Mr. Flax does testify in rebuttal. I'm

assuming that we'll, you know, be able to put him on.

But we do oppose that chart, the revised chart, because our summary chart we were not intending to introduce as substantive evidence. I --

THE COURT: This one that's on the screen now?

MR. MANGO: This one that's on the screen. Consistent with our position with the other chart is I really don't think, your Honor, under 611(a) pedagogical exhibits should be admitted as evidence, especially pedagogical exhibits that really discuss the law, as Miss Williams' chart does, and Mr. Flax's chart.

I -- so that's -- that's just the -- one of the reasons we think any revised Williams chart should not be admitted.

The other concern I have is this chart is now clearly different than what the jury saw,

Miss Williams' chart. And I do believe that for anything to be admitted into evidence there needs to be live witness testimony to have that evidence introduced substantively. And my recollection of her testimony does differ. I remember, going back to her testimony, I believe she said commercial

chemical products have no bearing on this case; yet, they're still on this chart.

THE COURT: Miss Henderson, bring yours up again, please.

Now, where are you referring, Mr. Mango?

MR. MANGO: In the lower left where it says: Commercial chemical product return to process. Substitute direct reuse feedstock substitute for commercial chemical product.

Again, it's my recollection that she had said that a CCP, as she used on her original chart, the -- because I do have the original here -- the initials CCP were used. And I believe she testified that CCP has really no bearing on this case.

But I'm just more concerned with, after

Mr. Flax's testimony, if -- if, again, he testifies

on rebuttal, there's certain issues in this chart

that, when you read the regulations, in this white

box here this is not what the regulations say.

The -- the regulations don't say "used on the land"

in that. The regulations do not say "used as a

fuel unless that fuel is non-waste fuel." That's

not what the regulations say. So, not only do we

oppose it on just pure 611 grounds --

THE COURT: What does the regulation say, in your view?

MR. MANGO: Which, your Honor, we have added it to our chart. But the regulations are very clear that a definition of solid waste is, "used to produce a fuel," not "used as a fuel." That's not what it says. It says -- I'm reading from 261 -- 40 CFR 261.2(c)(1) -- I'm sorry -- (c)(2)(B), which is, solid -- it's not a solid waste if it's used to produce a fuel or otherwise contained in fuels.

That's a little different than "used as a fuel unless that fuel is a non-waste fuel."

THE COURT: And what's the "used on land" language that you disagree with?

MR. MANGO: The "used on land" language, according to Mr. -- again, the testimony we're going to highlight, there's really two land questions when you recycle a product and there is an issue with the land. The first is -- well, this one, I believe she's trying to -- trying to encompass 261.2(c)(1)(B), which says, "used to produce products that are applied to or placed on the land or are otherwise contained in products that are applied to or placed on the land."

That's what I believe she's trying to encompass as used on the land. But this white box completely ignores the portion of the regulation immediately subsequent to -- or preceding that, which says,

"The material is a solid waste when it is" -- and this is nowhere in this chart -- "applied to or placed on the land in a manner that constitutes disposal."

That's exactly what we have here, based on the Court's definition of disposal, which is totally absent from this white box. So I think -- I think to introduce this would be -- would do an injustice to what the regulations actually say.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Linsin.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, I will go back. Part of the difficulty here, of course, is that counsel in one breath is objecting that this is intended as a recitation of the law, and then is also -- is then objecting that it does not precisely quote the law.

THE COURT: Or the testimony.

MR. LINSIN: Well, your Honor, I disagree on that regard. I do agree in one respect, that Miss Williams testified that commercial chemical products are not relevant. I left that sub-bullet

in in its entirety. Counsel is correct that

Miss Williams did not reference commercial chemical

product in that regard.

What -- what I -- what I believe is, in fact, faithful to the discussion and the -- to

Miss Williams' testimony is that the discussion in -- in this white box focused on whether or not -- and the whole major heading here is whether or not the material is discarded. And she offered these as examples of conditions within the regulation defining solid waste that illustrate whether something is discarded. And used on the land, I believe, is -- is -- and her testimony was relating to products that were applied to or placed on the land. And that is exactly the language that has been quoted here.

I also believe that she spoke at some length about this definition of solid waste focusing on whether or not the material was discarded. And that, I believe, would constitute this issue — incorporate this issue of applied to or placed on the land in a manner that constitutes disposal. The concept of land disposal, I believe, is captured both in Miss Williams' testimony concerning solid waste, but also then with regard

to the exemption itself on the right-hand box.

So I -- this was not represented in

Miss Williams' testimony as a verbatim recitation

of the regulation. It was offered as a summary of

her testimony regarding the elements in the solid

waste definition that she deemed relevant.

If counsel believes, in the course of
Mr. Flax's testimony, that he can poke holes in
this or indicate why it is defective, that's one
thing. But I don't believe it is reasonable to say
that this is not faithful to Miss Williams'
testimony, save for the comment here about
commercial chemical product, because she testified
repeatedly both on direct and cross that this issue
of discard, this issue of whether something was
disposed of on the land or elsewhere, was central
to the definition and assessment of whether the
material was a solid waste. And I believe that
that concept is clearly captured in the bullets
that have been included in here.

And the point here, your Honor, is, whether counsel believes that this is -- that

Miss Williams' opinions are accurate or whether their expert believes they are accurate, that is a matter for the jury to assess. But Miss Williams

testified that this is a chart she prepared, she testified in a manner that is consistent with this chart, and we believe it is reasonable, and we believe the Court has discretion under 611 to permit the admission of exhibits like this when the Court believes they could assist the trier of fact in understanding the testimony. I believe that's exactly what this chart does.

THE COURT: All right. Well, what is your position with respect to Mr. Mango's point that bullet point -- open circle in the white box number 4, with respect to used as a fuel. He says it's not accurate with respect to the regulation as well as the testimony, in that it should read something to the extent of to the production of a fuel?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. The terminology says, "used to produce a fuel or otherwise contained in fuels." That's the language from the regulations.

I think that was the terminology, Mr. Mango?

And before -- again, my only comment, your

Honor -- obviously we defer to the Court. If the

Court does introduce this, then clearly we would

want to introduce ours, but the government's

position is they should just both be as teaching

aids at this point.

THE COURT: All right. I want to clarify, though, and resolve the "used to produce as a fuel," that language.

MR. LINSIN: Well, there are a couple of points, your Honor. To be -- I do not recall, as I sit here, precisely what Miss Williams testified, and so I'm not going to represent to the Court that I do. I believe the terminology is -- is -- the distinction in the terminology is not that critical, especially in light of this fact, your Honor. In the indictment itself the government has described coke as a material -- one moment, please -- and I'm quoting now from paragraph 3 of the indictment -- "Coke is used in the steel mill and foundry industries as an additive in the steel-making process." An additive, not as a fuel.

The government has described coke as a component in the mixture of a material, not as a fuel in the production of material.

I do believe that Miss Williams testified about this. I anticipate, given what counsel has said,

Mr. Flax will be testifying about it. My point is

I do not believe that the distinction "used to produce" or "used as" is all that critical to the

analysis here. If -- we'll be happy to check our notes with regard to Miss Williams' testimony on this point. If her testimony included the wording "to produce," we would, as we've demonstrated, be happy to amend this to make sure it is consistent with her testimony, but I just can't represent to the Court that I have a specific memory on this.

THE COURT: Okay. You know, I think I had mentioned last week that I thought it was somewhat problematic to proffer this as a summary of the testimony of the witness and -- of Miss Williams. I'm not sure it is that. I mean, it's -- it comes across by way of that it's captioned as a summary, if you will, of the law, which I think would be problematic, and I'm not sure that -- the caption -- I'm not sure that the caption makes clear what it is, which I think has to be resolved, because I don't want the jury to get the wrong impression.

I think in some respects this can be very helpful, but if it reflects the law, I'm not sure it's -- it would be admissible for that purpose. If it's a summary of the testimony, the way it's captioned I'm not sure that it reflects that. So I think there has to be some modification, and I'm

willing to give it another go, because I think it can be helpful, and I would consider admitting it under 611. But I would admit it -- I will admit the government's. That's the guid pro guo here.

MR. LINSIN: And, your Honor, as we've indicated, we would not have an objection on that score. We think — this is not meant to supplant, as I trust the Court understands, the Court's guidance on the law. We would be happy to add to the caption, if the Court believes it would be helpful, Miss Williams' opinions regarding what materials are regulated as waste or something to that effect.

THE COURT: I think that has to be done.

Because it's technically not a summary of all of her testimony, and I think that's part of the government's objection. I think that's legitimate. I think it cannot summarize the law as it stands. I think that's a legitimate. But if it's -- if it's an opinion with respect to the application of the law to the facts, I think the jury needs some guidance. And I think we sense that from the questions, which I thought were really very good questions under the circumstances.

So, you know, with the background

modifications, with maybe an effort to see just what was testified to on the fuel open circle point, and a rearticulation of the caption, I will consider admissibility as a constructive aid under 611 to the handling of testimony and the understanding of the testimony. And the quid pro quo with that is that the government's exhibit will similarly be admitted. Okay?

MR. LINSIN: All right. We will do so, your Honor.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I just intend during Mr. Fax's testimony, obviously as a rebuttal, to reference Defendant's 0000, and I didn't know if at this point we should be referencing the original Defendant's 0000 during his testimony. Because I'd like to pull it up on the screen, because he's going to say what he agrees with, what he doesn't agree with, as would be proper with a rebuttal witness.

THE COURT: No. Put that one aside. Work with, until we get it resolved, this 0000.

MR. MANGO: Okay.

THE COURT: This is the one you showed to Flax, but we'll try to get it modified to our satisfaction before Flax becomes the rebuttal

witness. Okay?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

MR. LINSIN: All right. That will -- if we could have over lunch to get that, your Honor because we just don't have the capacity here to make modifications. Miss Henderson could go back over lunch to do that. We'll certainly work to accomplish that.

THE COURT: All right. Now, you have a witness --

MR. LINSIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there anything else that we --

MR. LINSIN: One other very brief just logistical matter, your Honor. Mr. Glasner will be departing town later today, probably sometime after lunch, to return home for the Passover observance. He will be gone the end of the day today, and tomorrow, and returning later on Wednesday. We would just ask the Court, since I presume it's something the jurors would notice, that Mr. Glasner had a -- is attending to personal matters and will be returning later in the week, something to that effect. So, thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. No problem. Okay.

MR. MANGO: I would just propose maybe instead of a lunch -- I don't expect Mr. Iannello's testimony to take that long. It's possible we could be done by 11:00 o'clock with Mr. Iannello, and maybe it would make sense to then just take an hour break instead of -- you know, send the jury out. I just propose that just so the Court knows that I don't expect to be long with Mr. Iannello either.

THE COURT: Okay. Then as far as Mr. Flax is concerned, how long?

MR. MANGO: Not long either, your Honor.

A very brief rebuttal witness. I think 15 minutes
on my side, 15, 20 minutes.

THE COURT: Okay. And then both sides will have rested?

MR. MANGO: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's see where we are timewise, and then we'll go from there. Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, with Mr. Iannello, he's the firefighter --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PERSONIUS: -- and we've discovered there is a 13-second video of this fire. We've marked it as a defense exhibit. We're going to

offer that. I don't think the government is going to oppose that offer. And I just want you to be aware of that. We will get it into evidence.

My thought is it's almost clearer if you play it in the smaller size that it comes in. If you blow it up so it fills up the entire screen, it almost gets too blurry so that it's very hard to see. So if it's smaller so if it takes up a fraction of the screen, it's almost easier to see. I just want you to be aware of that.

THE COURT: All right. We have two drop screens that go from ceiling to floor in the courtroom, which I've been anxious to use,

Mr. Personius. You're not anxious to try them out,
I take it then.

MR. PERSONIUS: Well, if you expanded them to that level, they would be completely useless, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Yeah, that's fine.

MR. PERSONIUS: Okay.

THE COURT: That's fine. I take it there's no objection?

MR. MANGO: Yeah, no objection, your Honor. In fact, because it's so quick and small, it may make sense to play it a couple of times.

MR. PERSONIUS: And the other thing I intend to do is to stop it a couple of times in the middle of it is helpful too. It becomes like a still shot.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's bring the jury in now, and then after we're done with Mr. Iannello I'll talk with Miss Majerowski, and we'll find out what her situation is and how we handle that.

Chris, if you would, please. Good morning.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome back.

Good to see everybody. It wouldn't be a Monday if it weren't our chance to see you again. So thank you. Please have a seat.

Okay. We are back on in the case of United
States versus Tonawanda Coke Corporation and Mark
Kamholz, defendants. I think we're all
knowledgable now in terms of who our jurors are and
roll call waived. And, of course, you know, ladies
and gentlemen, that the parties in this case are
two defendants, and they're represented by the
various attorneys, and I think I'll dispense with
the introductions today. You know the technicians,
as well, the paralegals that are doing our work on

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the monitors for you in terms of the evidence, so I think everybody is ready to go.

And we have, of course, Mr. Paul Saffrin, who is the president of Tonawanda Coke, and Mark Kamholz, who's the individual defendant, here as well.

So, with that, and again I thank you for your efforts on Thursday, and we ask you to keep your minds open. Remember the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. The defense has chosen to put on a case. We're in that case now. It doesn't have a burden, though, and both defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence, which is in place for purposes of this case until and if you decide that the proof has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that either the corporate or the individual defendant or both are guilty as charged on the count that you are considering. And each count has to be separately considered as to each defendant and as to all of the essential elements of the charge that applies to that particular count.

So, with that, I think the defense has another witness. You're going to call that witness,

Mr. Personius?

MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, we call Michael Iannello.

THE COURT: If you would approach the witness box, sir, I'll tell you when to stop.

Right about there is good, and we'll have you turn towards the jury and --

M I C H A E L I A N N E L L O, having been duly sworn as a witness, testified as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Witness, I think you're positioned the right way. Speak to the jury. They're here to listen to what you have to say. Get a little closer to the microphone or bring it towards you. You don't have to be right on top of it. All you have to do is speak in a conversational tone.

Do your best to answer concisely and directly the question. Try not to volunteer any information. That usually complicates things. If the question calls for a yes or no, please try to answer it in that fashion. That's helpful.

If you don't understand a question, ask the lawyers or me to repeat the question, and I'll direct that that be done, or I will do it myself.

1 If there's an objection, wait until I rule on 2 the objection, and then I will give you 3 instructions on whether to complete your answer, 4 start it again, wait for another question, 5 et cetera. 6 Do you understand? 7 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 8 THE COURT: All right. Sounds like you 9 will carry on the microphone, but state your full 10 name and spell your last name, please. 11 THE WITNESS: Michael Iannello. Last name 12 is I-A-N-N-E-L-L-O. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, 14 Mr. Iannello. 15 Your witness, Mr. Personius. MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, your Honor. 16 17 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. PERSONIUS: 18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Iannello. 19 Α. How are you, sir? 20 I'm very good. Thank you. We've met before, Q. 21 obviously. 22 Α. That's correct. 23 And you've also had an opportunity to meet with Q. 24 the government regarding your testimony, correct?

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Α.

Yes, I have.

- Q. You've made yourself equally available to both parties?
 - A. That's correct also.
 - Q. Now, you are a member of the Elwood Fire Company?
 - A. Yes. The Elwood Volunteer Fire Company.
 - Q. Okay. And how long have you been a member of that fire company?
 - A. I'm in my 15th year.
- Q. Was there a time when you were the chief for the fire company?
- 12 A. Yes.

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- 13 Q. When was that, please?
- A. I served as chief in '09 and 2010, and years

 prior to that I was an assistant chief for six

 years.
- Q. And do you recall responding to a fire at the Tonawanda Coke Company in July of 2008?
 - A. I do.
- 20 Q. Now, the Elwood Fire Company, does that have some jurisdiction over the area where Tonawanda Coke is located?
- A. Two months out of the year we cover and we take
 jurisdiction over what we call our District 1
 commercial. July and January are Elwood's months.

- All right. So that during those two months, if there was an event that occurred, for example, at Tonawanda Coke, Elwood would be the primary responding company?
 - That's correct.
 - Q. And then there are other companies that cover that area during the other months of the year?
 - Α. Yes.

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- And this fire that you responded to at Q. 10 Tonawanda Coke, do you remember when in 2008 that 11 was?
- 12 Α. The date is July 8th.
- 13 Q. Of 2008?
- 14 Α. 2008.
- 15 Q. All right. Now, do you remember how you first 16 discovered that there was a fire at Tonawanda Coke?
- 17 Yes, I do. Α.
- 18 Would you tell the jury how that happened, 19 please?
- 20 I was heading to a meeting in the town of 21 Tonawanda, traveling down Sheridan Drive, and I 22 noticed heavy black smoke from what at that time I 23 thought could have been, you know, River Road. 24 was at the corner of Military and Sheridan, and I 25 radioed to my office, the dispatch office, asking

them if there was any incident that we needed to be made aware of.

- Q. And from making that contact did you determine whether or not Elwood had been notified?
- A. Not at that contact, no.
- Q. All right. What did you do at that point then?
- A. I informed them that I would be traveling towards the area where the black smoke was and I would report back to them.
- Q. So what direction did you travel in then?
- 11 A. I continued west on Sheridan Drive.
- Q. And were you able to track where the smoke was coming from as you traveled?
- 14 | A. Yes.

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- Q. And when you -- did you go to the end of Sheridan?
- A. I made my way over from -- Sheridan turns into

 Grand Island Boulevard, and then I turned onto

 Kenmore Avenue, and then I proceeded down Sawyer

 Avenue to reach River Road.
- Q. Okay. And when you got to River Road had you heard back yet from the fire company?
- 23 A. I did not.
- Q. All right. When you got River Road, what direction did you proceed in?

- A. I determined that the fire -- the smoke was coming from Tonawanda Coke on River Road, and I proceeded to head in that direction and make my way up into Tonawanda Coke's driveway.
- Q. And you could see, as you headed up the driveway, the smoke on the Tonawanda Coke property?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Could we, Lauren, please, put on the screen -this is in evidence -- Government's Exhibit 105.37.

Do you see a photograph on the screen,

- Mr. Iannello?
- 12 A. Yes, sir.

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- 13 Q. And you and I have reviewed this before?
- 14 A. That's correct.
- Q. Do you recognize what's depicted in this photograph?
- 17 A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Would you please tell the jury what you recognize?
- A. I recognize that -- the access road from River
 Road into the plant, and I recognize the facility
 through other pictures that I've seen and being
 on-site.
 - THE COURT: If you'll tap the access road, please.

BY MR. PERSONIUS:

- Q. You can tap the screen, and you'll either get a square or an arrow. Okay.
- A. That's the access road to the facility.
- Q. And just so it's clear to the jury, too, could you please tap where River Road is?

Thank you. That's good.

So you proceeded up that access road?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. And what happened when you got -- was there a guardhouse you came to?
 - A. Yeah. I was stopped at the guardhouse once I got all the way up the access road into the facility.
 - Q. All right. And what happened at that point?
 - A. I had asked the guard if there was an incident that we needed to be notified of, if something was, you know, out of control.

THE COURT: All right. Where is the guardhouse?

Thank you.

BY MR. PERSONIUS:

- Q. And did you get a response to that inquiry?
- A. She wasn't -- it was a female guard. She was not aware that there was any incident that needed

any more attention than what was going on.

- Q. So what did you do at that point?
- A. I suggested to her that in my opinion there was something more to what was going on on the facility than what she was notified of or hadn't been informed of at that time. So I radioed to my dispatch and told them that I thought we had an incident that needed attention by the fire service.
- Q. All right. And what -- at that point what did you do after you made that radio call?
- A. At that point they notified me back that somebody from the facility had called, and that at that moment -- we're notified to respond to fire calls by a series of tones that go out over our fire radios, and at that moment they had set the tones off and dispatched the rest of the fire service that would respond to that particular call.
- Q. Did you then proceed onto the Tonawanda Coke property?
- A. I did.

- Q. All right. And can you show us on this screen what direction you went in, please?
- A. I proceeded down a road that looks like it
 appears to go through the middle of the facility,
 which would be this road here.

Q. Okay.

- A. And I made my way towards the -- towards the incident.
 - Q. And by "the incident," you mean the smoke? Is that what you were looking --
 - A. Yeah, where the fire was and the smoke was being derived from.
 - Q. All right. We're going to go to another photograph, and I want to draw your attention to that long white building that part of my arrow is on.
- A. I see it.
- Q. If you could, note where that is, and we'll see if that's in the next photo that we put up.

Could you take this one down, please, Lauren, and put up Government Exhibit in evidence 105.40.

Okay. In this photograph, Mr. Iannello, do you see that long white building I put the arrow on in the last photo?

- A. I do.
- Q. And does that help you determine where the smoke was coming from?
- 23 A. That's correct.
 - Q. Okay. Could you show the jury with another tap where you determined the smoke was coming from?

- A. Up a little higher.
- Q. All right.

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- 3 A. A little bit -- it's not working on my screen.
- 4 Can you clear that?
 - Q. Want to try again?
 - A. Let's try that. That's better.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you. And did you proceed with your vehicle in that direction?
 - A. That's correct.
 - Q. Are you able to tell us or show us on this photograph, Exhibit 105.40, where you proceeded to?
- 12 A. The second one that I highlighted there is more accurate.
 - Q. All right. Thank you. Now, as you went into the Tonawanda Coke property and arrived at the location you've noted on this photograph, did you come into contact with anyone at Tonawanda Coke that you spoke to about the fire?
 - A. Yes, I did.
- 20 Q. Who was that please?
- 21 A. Kevin Walsh.
- 22 Q. And do you know Kevin Walsh?
- A. I know Kevin outside of Tonawanda Coke through
 the fire service. He's a past chief of the Kenmore
 Volunteer Fire Department.

- Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Walsh about this fire?
- A. I did.

- Q. Would you share that with the jury, please?
- A. Basically, as I got out of my vehicle, I asked Kevin what was going on, and he said we had an incident here that got out of control, that plant personnel could not handle. And he had called he was the one that called dispatch and called the fire department to have us respond.

And I asked him a few questions about what was going on, how the fire started, and I was informed that it was ignited by some work that was being done around the area of the point of the fire.

- Q. Did Mr. Walsh describe for you what that work was that was being done?
- A. He may have at the time. I know welding had something to do with it, but I couldn't say specifically what they were doing.
- Q. All right. Now, when you got to the point near the fire where you've shown us that you stopped, can you just tell us in your own words what you observed?
- A. Basically, it was an exterior fire that, from my standpoint of being a fire chief, I would say

was a small building and some ground, grass, that had been burning around this -- what we've been calling a shack, that looked liked it had been abandoned.

Q. All right. Lauren, would you take this picture down, please, and put up in evidence Government Exhibit 125.01.

We have another photograph on the screen,
Mr. Iannello. Do you recognize what's shown in
this picture?

A. Yes, I do.

- Q. Would you tell the jury what you recognize, please?
 - A. The brick building with the wood -- wood-type structure roof and the wood frames was where the fire -- the center of the fire was when I pulled up to the scene. And grass -- I'm sorry -- grass and grounds around it were also burning.
- Q. Can you -- so the jury -- I think it's obvious, but could you tap the building you're referring to?

All right. And there's a tank behind the building?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. Do you see that? It's yellowish in color?
- A. I do see it.

- Q. All right. And can you show the jury, if you can on this picture, if this is fair, where the -- what the scope of this fire was? Is that -- can you show that on this photograph?
- A. Will this allow me to circle?
- Q. Yes. Absolutely.

- A. I'd say it was contained to this area right here, and there was -- behind this building in this area there was some ground clutter that was burning. You know, maybe grass or any rubbish that might have been there, wood particles, or maybe some scrap from something.
- Q. We haven't covered this. I don't know how important it is. What time of day was it when you got there?
- A. I'm just trying to think, that my appointment where I was headed -- I want to say it was -- I'm going to guess it was in the morning between 10:00 and noon. That's the best of my knowledge, without looking at any records, when the incident occurred.
- Q. You've shown us on this exhibit that's on the screen, 125.01, with two different circles the area where you -- you observed the fire when you arrived there, is that correct?
- A. That's correct.

- Q. Now, how long were you at the -- at the scene?
- A. From the time we were asked to respond and the time we cleaned up, it was approximately three
- Q. Okay. Did other fire companies also come to
 - A. Yeah. My understanding is that six fire companies responded and seven pieces of fire apparatus, trucks, equipment, responded.
 - Q. One of those six would have been Elwood?
- 11 A. That's correct.

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hours.

the scene?

- Q. Now, as you've shown the scope of the fire when you got there, in Exhibit 125.01, during the period of time you were there did the scope of the fire expand?
 - A. Not to my knowledge. It was pretty contained to that area.
- Q. All right. Now, I'm going to put -- I'll try
 to do this. Do you see where I put an arrow on the
 right-hand side?
 - A. I do.
 - Q. And was the fire ever in that area?
- 23 \blacksquare A. Not that I know of. No, not to my knowledge.
- Q. Okay. During your preparation to testify here, were you provided with a -- a videotape?

A. Not --

- Q. A film or something of the fire?
- A. No. Nothing other than what was emailed to me about something -- that 13-second video that you mentioned. It was not a tape.
- Q. That's why I fumbled when I said it. What would you call it?
- A. A digital video clip from an email.
- Q. Did you view a digital video clip of the fire?
- 10 A. Yes, I did.
 - Q. All right. And was that a fair and accurate depiction of at least part of the fire, that's shown on that clip?
 - A. I would say yes, it is. It's my -- most -- that would compare to my recollection of the incident.
 - MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, we've marked that as Defense Exhibit for identification SSSS.

 I'm happy to go through a foundation if necessary.
 - MR. MANGO: We have no objection, your Honor.
 - MR. PERSONIUS: So, your Honor, what I would propose, if we could then, that I'll ask Sheila, please, once you confirm it's in evidence, to put that up on the screen. Is that okay, Judge,

1 if we do that? 2 THE COURT: Yes. SSSS received in 3 evidence, may be published, no objection. We're going to drop the lighting down a little bit. 4 5 MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, Judge. THE COURT: If you would, please. 6 7 (Defendants' Exhibit SSSS was received 8 into evidence.) 9 MR. PERSONIUS: Members of the jury, if 10 you look behind you, I think those wooden slats 11 are --12 MR. MANGO: No, there is a shade that's 13 going to come behind it. THE COURT: Okay. You've been here now 14 15 for 12 hours. 16 MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, does Mary have 17 any popcorn? 18 Your Honor, as I mentioned -- and we can do it 19 both ways. I -- from my looking at this, I think 20 even though this is small, it's clearer like this 21 than if we fill the whole screen. We can do it 22 both ways if you'd like us to.

THE COURT: No, let's try it this way.

MR. PERSONIUS: Try it this way? Okay.

23

BY MR. PERSONIUS:

- Q. And before we do it, if I could, do you see
 the -- the start of this video clip on the screen?
- A. Yes.

- Q. Okay. And can you just, for the jury, point to -- do you recognize anything on the screen right now?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. Tell the jury what you recognize, please.
- A. I recognize the -- the shed, the shack

 building, and the tank behind the building that -
 where the center of the fire was. The center of

 origin.
 - Q. Can you tap the screen where you see the building? I don't know if it'll work, but -- thank you. And then where you see the tank.

That's great. Thank you. I'm going to take that off. And what we're going to do, with the Court's permission, Mr. Iannello, we're going to play it through once, and then we'll go back and maybe stop it a couple of times.

A. Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: Okay. Could you please play it, Sheila.

(The above-referenced video clip was

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               played for the jury.)
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               THE COURT: Okay. Enlarge it and play it
 3
      once.
            Okay.
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     BY MR. PERSONIUS:
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         Great. Just so it's on the record, we just
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      finished playing it the first time?
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      A. Understood.
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         Now we're going to play it again, filling up
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      the whole screen, and see how it looks.
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               (The above-referenced video clip was
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               played for the jury.)
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               MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, do you have a
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      judgment on which one is better?
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               THE COURT: No. You can work with either
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      one.
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               MR. PERSONIUS: Yeah. I didn't think the
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      big one was that bad.
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               THE COURT: No. It came across, I think,
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      reasonably well this time, so --
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               MR. PERSONIUS: I didn't think it was bad,
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      so maybe we'll try it with the big one.
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               THE COURT: Please.
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     BY MR. PERSONIUS:
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      Q. Now, the entire duration of that is about 13
25
      seconds, that clip?
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- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. Could we get it back up again, Sheila, without playing it, please?

All right. Now, you've already shown us from the smaller size where the tank is and where this building is that you saw that was burning. The smoke, there's some black smoke?

A. Yes.

- Q. And from being present at the fire, did you determine what the source of that black smoke was?
- A. At the time I -- I assumed that the shack that was burning, it was the roofing material that was on the -- that made up the roof of that shack, and any wood that was involved in the fire.
- Q. All right. And have you since learned, from talking to the government and talking to us, that on the surface surrounding this tank -- on the ground surrounding this tank there was some coal tar?
- A. That was mentioned to me, but at the time I didn't know if there was anything like that involved in the fire.
- Q. Sheila, could we play this to -- and stop it, please, at five seconds?

(The above-referenced video clip was

1 played for the jury.) 2 BY MR. PERSONIUS: 3 Now, what we see is we see the black smoke and 4 some of this tank behind the smoke, correct? 5 That's correct. 6 Where I put the arrow to the left of it, do you Q. 7 see some white smoke coming out of the top of the 8 tank? 9 Α. Yes. 10 And are you able to tell the jury why there was 11 white smoke coming out of the top of the tank? 12 My estimate would be that it was caused by 13 whatever was heating up inside the tank and it was venting out. That's probably a vent to the top of 14 15 that tank. And whatever was burning around it could have possibly gotten in some of the access 16 17 points, so it was maybe a residual smoke from the 18 fire. 19 Do you know whether or not the fire actually 20 traveled to the inside of this large tank? 21 I do not. Α. 22 Could we continue, Sheila, and stop, please, at 23 about 12 seconds? 24 (The above-referenced video clip was

played for the jury.)

BY MR. PERSONIUS:

- Q. Okay. We've stopped this clip now at 12 seconds. And I'm going take this arrow off that's on there. And again, where I put the one arrow, could you tell the jury what that shows?
- A. That looks to be the front of the shack and flames inside the door of the shack.
- Q. Okay. And I'm going to put another arrow over and to the right of that. Do you see where that other arrow is?
- A. Yes.
- 12 Q. And was there fire over in that area?
- \blacksquare A. No flames in that area. No fire.
 - Q. All right. And are you able on this screen to again show the jury where, during the period of time you were present, that the fire was focused?
 - A. I stood about 30 to 40 feet away from the shack in this area here, but a little further back. Not quite that close to the scene.
 - Q. And can you draw a circle around where the fire -- where the fire was, please?

In that area?

- A. Yes. Up into that area.
- Q. All right. Now, one other question while we've got it stopped here. And we can go back to a still

photo. But do you see this kind of white -whitish rectangular item on the right side of the
screen where I put another arrow?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And do you know what that is?
- A. After looking at pictures after, it's a -- it's a disabled railcar, tanker car for a train.
 - Q. Do you recall whether or not that tanker car was present when you were present for the fire?
 - A. In honesty, I do not recall that being there.
 - Q. All right. Thank you.

I think we can take that down now, Sheila.

Thank you. Could -- Lauren, could you please put on the screen in evidence Government

Exhibit 125.03.

Do you see the photograph on the screen that has the sticker 125.03, Mr. Iannello?

- A. I do.
- Q. Do you recognize what's shown in this picture?
- 20 A. I do.
- Q. Now, can you tell the jury what -- what that is on the right-hand side of the screen?
- A. That is the shack that was the center of the fire.
- 25 Q. Okay. Lauren, could you please put up

Government Exhibit 125.04, which is also in evidence?

Do you recognize what's shown in this photograph, Mr. Iannello?

A. I do.

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- Q. All right. Do you remember I asked you at the end of the video clip about the white object that you could see?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The white rectangular object?
- 11 A. Yes. Yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. And do you see that in this photograph?
- 13 A. Are you referring to the -- the front --
- 14 Q. That object.
- 15 A. Oh, okay. Because there was a -- object was
 16 the building in the previous -- I do see that, yes.
- Q. And is it your testimony you don't recall that partially demolished tank being in that position when you were in the fire?
- 20 A. That's correct. From my standpoint, it wasn't in my -- my view.
- Q. All right. Lauren, would you please put up -again, this is in evidence -- Government
 Exhibit 3.04.
- Now, do you recognize, Mr. Iannello, what's

depicted in this photograph?

- A. I recognize it from the photos I was shown by both parties.
- Q. Okay. Did you see what's depicted in this photograph when you were at the fire scene?
- A. I did not.

- Q. And was any of the fire -- to your knowledge, based on your observations, did any of the fire involve this part of the property?
- A. No, it did not.
 - Q. Okay. You can take that down, Lauren, please.

 When the steps were being taken to put out the fire, was -- do you know, was any water sprayed inside the tank?
- A. From my original report it did say that we had stuck a hose line into an access panel inside the tank.
- Q. Do you know why that was done?
 - A. I would say it was probably done for cooling purposes, just to kind of get a different angle at the fire. You know, if there was anything in there that could have been ignited, more of a cooldown.
- Q. All right. During the period of time that you were -- you were at the fire, did you see any substances coming out of that large tank?

A. No, I did not.

- Q. And once the fire apparatus was in place to put out the fire, how long did it take to actually put out the fire?
- A. I think the extinguishing was done probably in 20 to 25, 30 minutes, and then the rest was what we call overhaul. It would be maybe cooling down.

 That's probably at the time we stuck the nozzle inside the tank, cooling down the grounds after the incident and just turning things over. That would be considered overhaul. That probably took another half hour to 40 minutes.
 - Q. Now, the term "hazmat," does that have meaning to you as a fireman?
- A. I know what it means, yes.
- Q. Would you tell the jury what your understanding is of that term?
 - A. A hazmat situation would be an incident involving hazardous materials that would be suited for a different type of response.
 - Q. Had you received any information, as you came to the scene and while you were present at the scene, that this was a hazmat circumstance?
 - A. I got no information, and I had no concern at that point that it was a hazmat situation.

- Q. And based on your experience at the scene in putting out this fire, would it have made a difference to you to have known that this may have been a hazmat circumstance?
- A. In my opinion, no.

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- Q. Now, at the conclusion of the work you did that day, unexpected, did you then prepare some type of report of this incident?
- A. Every incident that we respond to has a report attached to it for our fire company records.
 - Q. Okay. And was one prepared for this incident?
- 12 A. Yes. Yes, we did.
 - Q. You've looked at it?
- 14 A. Yes, I have.
- Q. For identification, Lauren, could we please put on the screen Government Exhibit 48, please?
- Do you see on the screen a document that has in the lower right a yellow sticker that says 48 on it?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Do you recognize what this is?
- A. Yeah. That's my Elwood Volunteer Fire
 Company's fire report.
- 24 \ Q. Related to the Tonawanda Coke fire?
- 25 A. That's correct.

Q. From July 8 of 2008?
A. Yes.

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MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, we offer it.

4 MR. MANGO: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. 48 received, no objection. May be published.

MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, Judge.

MR. MANGO: It is multiple pages, your Honor, just so the Court's aware of that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, Aaron.

(Government's Exhibit 48 was received into evidence.)

BY MR. PERSONIUS:

Q. The first page of this exhibit, Mr. Iannello -- why don't we do this. It will be a little easier to read.

Lauren, could you make the upper half larger, please? Thank you, Lauren.

Do you see at the top, Mr. Iannello, there's a reference to your fire company?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And to the date?
- 24 A. That's correct.
 - Q. All right. Now, it also, in the area I'm going

- to point to, in that area it talks about dates and times?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. That gives us the date again of July 8, 2008, right?
- A. Yes, it does.
 - Q. And it gives times ranging from 1114 to 1416.
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Would you tell the jury what those times indicate?
- A. The 1114 is military time when the initial signal went out to call for fire service.
- 13 Q. And then the 1416 time?
- A. That would be the time that the last piece of apparatus called into service, and that's recorded at the Town of Tonawanda dispatch.
- Q. Now, let me get rid of that. And do you see
 where I put another arrow. It's in box C. It
 refers to incident type?
- 20 A. Yes, I do.
- 21 Q. And there is an entry there?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. That says, "Outside rubbish fire, other"?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. Did you select that as the description of this

fire?

- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. And can you tell the jury why you described it in that fashion?
- A. This particular piece of reporting software is a very -- a large, layered piece of software, and there's not many categories to select of what the -- what the incident was. Our fire company uses this piece just more as a tracking of our personnel, and it's very general when it comes to putting information in from an incident, per se, like this one here. So you get to this section -- after you fill out the address and the location, you get to Section C, and it limits you to what to select to continue on with the reporting process. So outside rubbish fire was the closest selection I could have made to move forward with completing the rest of the document.
- Q. Okay. Thank you. Could you make it large, this page large again, please, Lauren.

The only other thing on this page I want to note, Mr. Iannello -- we're going to make a section of the first page larger. Do you see the box that says "Completed modules"?

A. Yes, I do.

- Q. And there's a reference to a Hazmat 7?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. That has not been completed on this form?
- A. That's correct.
 - Q. Okay. And what is that box used for?
- 6 If you select in the upper area C -- if you Α. 7 select a category that has a hazmat incident as 8 being the cause, then the software will direct you 9 to questions regarding those items. So because we 10 selected that it was an exterior structure -- or 11 exterior rubbish fire, it avoids those hazmat 12 questions, because it doesn't pertain to the 13 incident.
 - Q. All right. And I asked you this at the outset.

 I'm going to ask you one more time just because you may have found out something once you got there.

 Did you ever determine what the actual cause or starting point of this fire was?
 - A. Other than it being caused by a spark from -- from some sort of torch or welding that was being performed.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you. Could you make this page larger again, please, Lauren. And just for completeness, would you go to the second page of the exhibit, please.

And is it correct that the only entries on the second page are way up at the top and then way down at the bottom?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. And as far as there's no substantive information on the second page?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Would you go to the third page, please, Lauren.

 And on the third page would it be correct that
 the only entries are way at the top?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. And there's no substantive information on the third page either?
- 14 A. There is something in Section D.
- 15 | Q. D?

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- A. Yes.
- 17 Q. This area here?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. Could you make that bigger, Lauren, 20 please.
- Okay. And tell us, please, what -- what the entry is there.
- A. This area gets filled out as a summary of what
 was put into the report from the upper pages. And
 again it's very, very general due to the fact that

these are predetermined terms and they fall into place when you make selections from the original Category C.

- Q. All right. And did you check the box for Item Number 3?
- A. Yes, I did.

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- Q. Okay. And that 3 says, "Item first ignited," and then it says "Flammable liquid gas in from final container." And then a box is checked that says, "Check if spread was confined to the object of origin."
- 12 A. That's correct.
 - Q. What was your reason for checking that box?
 - A. That box was checked because there was no spread. It was contained to the area that we were fighting, was my definition of that.
 - Q. And that's the area you previously described for us?
- 19 A. That's correct.
 - Q. You can take that down please, Lauren.
- MR. PERSONIUS: May I have a minute, please, Judge?
- 23 THE COURT: Certainly.
- MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, those are all the questions we have.

1 Thank you, Mr. Iannello. 2 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 3 THE COURT: Okay. I may have missed this, 4 but, Mr. Iannello, did you take that video that you 5 testified about, or was that taken by somebody 6 else? 7 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I did not take that 8 video. I could give you an idea of where it did 9 originate from. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Just my question was, 11 you did not take it, right? THE WITNESS: I did not. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 14 Mr. Linsin, any questions? 15 MR. LINSIN: No questions. Thank you, 16 your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome. 18 Mr. Mango. 19 MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MANGO: 20 21 Good morning, Mr. Iannello. Q. 22 Α. Good morning. 23 Q. How are you?

Q. We've -- we have met on a couple occasions, is

Very good. Thank you.

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Α.

that correct?

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And again, my name is Aaron Mango. I'm an assistant United States attorney.

And what I'd like to talk about is, obviously, the fire incident that you responded to, okay,

Mr. Iannello?

- A. Sure.
- Q. When you arrived at the guard shack at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation, is it fair to say that the guard initially did not want to let you in?
- 12 A. That's correct.
 - Q. And when you arrived, while you were at the guard shack and then as you proceeded into the site, what you observed was dark, black smoke billowing into the air, is that right?
 - A. Yes, I did.
 - Q. And when you arrived on scene, is it fair to say that you observed some Tonawanda Coke employees trying to take some corrective action to put that fire out?
 - A. I can't say what their actions were, but there were employees when I reached the scene.
 - Q. And at some point you had a conversation with Mr. Walsh, I think you mentioned?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. And he's employed at the Tonawanda Coke
- 3 Corporation, are you aware of that?
 - A. I am.

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- Q. As a purchasing manager?
- A. I don't know what his role was, but if that's what you say.
 - Q. Okay. And is it fair to say that he told you that the tanks were empty?
- 10 A. Yes.
- Q. That the tank -- I should say the tank that
 you've now looked at the pictures of, that tank was
 empty.
- 14 A. That's correct.
- Q. And then after you arrived on scene, other fire personnel arrived on scene?
- 17 A. Yes.
- Q. And it included six -- well, five other fire departments other than yours and seven fire trucks or fire equipment --
- 21 A. That's correct.
- 22 Q. -- in total.
- All right. Lauren, if we could pull up

 Government Exhibit 125.02, please?
- 25 THE CLERK: Is it in evidence?

MR. MANGO: Yes, in evidence.

BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Mr. Iannello, do you see this on your screen?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. I don't think you were shown this exact photograph during your direct testimony, but is it fair to say that this tank in the middle of the screen, this is the tank that you were fighting the fire, that was the focus of your firefighting activities?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. All right.
- 13 A. That's correct.
- Q. And do you see something poking out in the left-hand side there? See where I put the arrow?
- 16 A. Yes.
- Q. It looks almost like a tank? Did you make any observations as to the tank in the background there on the left?
- A. Other than the pictures that I've seen, I had no involvement or knowledge of that tank.
- Q. Okay. And I want it to be very clear for today's purposes, Mr. Iannello. I know you've met with me several times --
- 25 A. Yes.

Q. -- along with the special agent. And you've met with defense a couple of times, and we've all probably showed you a number of photographs. So I want your recollection today to be focused on what you actually remember back in July of 2008.

So back -- sitting here today, do you recall in July of 2008 any fire or activity relating to that tank in the background on the left?

- A. I don't recall any activity of that tank being involved in our incident.
- Q. Okay. I'd like to pull up Government Exhibit 125.04 in evidence.

And, Mr. Iannello, you were shown this photograph. And there's some area back here where I put the arrow. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

- Q. Okay. And is it fair to say that you did not make any observations in the area where I put the arrow?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. And would it also be fair to say that you don't know whether Tonawanda Coke employees had actually put out a fire in this area before you arrived?
- A. That's correct. I have no knowledge.
 - Q. Okay. Now, looking at that scene, I'd like to

pull up -- you were shown Government Exhibit 105.40, which is in evidence.

I'd like to pull that up, please, Lauren.

Now, you see the arrow. You put some dots on the screen. I want to tell you, Mr. Iannello, this is a photograph that the parties have now stipulated was taken on April 21st of 2007. So this would be well over a year before you responded.

A. Okay. Thank you.

- Q. Okay. So could you say whether or not -- see that tank I've just put the box around -- whether it was in that condition when you arrived or not?
- A. I do not recall the conditions beyond that point. I cannot answer that.
- Q. Okay. And if we can now go back to Government Exhibit 125.04 in evidence, which we just looked at. Do you see that area back there where I put the arrow? And again you testified you did not make any observations in that area?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And during your testimony, Mr. Iannello,

 I think you said you did not -- for this tank here

 where I just put the arrow, you did not observe any

 material flow out of the tank, is that correct?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. All right. And so your observations of material flowing would be limited to this tank on the left where I put the arrow, is that correct?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. I believe you testified that you were standing about 30 to 40 feet away?
- A. Correct.
- Q. So that you were a safe distance from the fire?

 Bless you.
- So you were a safe distance from the fire?
- 12 A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. And if we could pull up Government

 Exhibit 125.03 in evidence, please.
 - Mr. Iannello, do you remember seeing this during your direct testimony?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Okay. Would it be fair to say that when you were on scene there was water used to put this fire out?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. All right. And the water that was being sprayed on that tank was also being sprayed on the ground. You mentioned there was some fire on the ground?

A. That's correct.

- Q. Okay. So -- so water from a fire hose was being shot onto the ground in this area?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. And when you were on scene, do you recall seeing the water create any type of pond or -- let me leave it at that. Do you recall any type of pond being created?
- A. There were areas around the base of the large tank that had water in it.
- Q. Okay. So, if there was water on the ground and material was leaking out of the tank from the base of the tank actually below the waterline, you would not have been able to see that, is that right?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Now, you were asked a little bit about you got no information that there was any type of hazardous concern on-site here?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. If the material that -- well, let's -let's actually -- I'd like to show that video
 again, your Honor, if we can go to SSSS, please,
 Sheila. And I'd like to -- if you can just enlarge
 it half of the screen, just drag it from here. I
 was able to do it. I don't know. If you just try

to drag from here and pull it that way. Yes.

Thank you. That's perfect.

Okay. So I'd like to try a third option, your

Honor, about halfway in between, if we can run it.

(The above-referenced video clip was

played for the jury.)

BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. All right. Thank you.
- So, Mr. Iannello, you were able to observe that video on the screen?
- 11 A. Yes.

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Q. If we could just go to the -- just the start, and not play it, Sheila. Okay.

And I believe it was your testimony that there was some firefighting activities occurring in this area behind the tank, is that right?

- A. No, sir. In that diagram where I put the two circles I was more -- I was considering this area here behind the shed.
- Q. Okay. All right. But it's fair to say that you see black smoke all around this tank, is that right?
- A. In this picture there's black smoke there, yes.

 Correct.
 - Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that maybe

there was not an actual flame, but something was burning to cause this black smoke in and around this tank back here, is that right?

- A. My observation of this would be that the fire and the smoke was being pushed against the tank and it was finding a path around it. I would have no knowledge if there was anything burning where you've highlighted there, by the way I'm reading the smoke.
- Q. Okay. But -- and it's your testimony, though, that you were standing about 30 to 40 feet in this direction here?
- A. Yes, correct. Right in that direction.
 - Q. Okay. Now, you talked about you were not aware of whether the ground or the tanks or anything contained any type of hazardous material, is that right?
- A. That's correct.

- Q. Now, if you had known that the ground in this area contained toxic levels of benzene, would that have been something you would have wanted to know?

 A. Yes.
- MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor.

 Nothing else.
- THE COURT: Okay. Miss DiFilippo, you

1 have this up, right? No? Miss Henderson? 2 All right. Play it from the beginning on. I'm 3 just looking at the jurors, and it looked like they 4 wanted to go through it one more time. Start it 5 again, please. Thank you. (The above-referenced video clip was 6 7 played for the jury.) 8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Any 9 redirect, Mr. Personius? 10 MR. PERSONIUS: One question, Judge. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. PERSONIUS: 11 12 Q. Mr. Iannello, based on being present at the 13 scene, based on seeing this video from the scene 14 again several times today, is there any question in 15 your mind as to where this fire was localized? 16 A. No. I'm pretty sure. 17 MR. PERSONIUS: No further questions, 18 Judge. 19 MR. MANGO: One brief follow-up, your 20 Honor. 21 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. MANGO: 22 Mr. Iannello, you never had a chance to go back 23 to the Tonawanda Coke? 24 That's correct. I have not been on the

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facility since the fire.

1 So if the fire had been in other areas, you 2 couldn't make that call, sitting here today? 3 Α. No. 4 Q. Okay. Thank you. 5 MR. MANGO: Nothing else, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Linsin, anything? 7 MR. LINSIN: Nothing. Thank you, your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Iannello, you are 10 excused. Thank you. 11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Okay. From the defense 13 standpoint, anything additional? 14 MR. LINSIN: Save for the one issue regarding that one chart, your Honor, Tonawanda 15 16 Coke does not have any additional witnesses to 17 present. 18 THE COURT: Okay. The defense then for 19 Tonawanda Coke rests subject to the resolve of the exhibits? 20 21 MR. LINSIN: That is correct, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 23 Mr. Personius. 24 MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, the defense as

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to Mark Kamholz rests.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take a 15-minute break. I'll bring you back out here, and I'll give you the plan for the day. Okay? Thank you very much. Keep your minds open, please. The case is not concluded yet.

(Jury excused from the courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right. That's a little fiat lux, right? I mean, for a little Latin flavor to what we're doing?

Okay. I did speak with Miss Majerowski, I think, in your observation, and the note that reads Thursday, March 26th, was meant to read Tuesday, March 26th, which is tomorrow. And she is willing to come back, depending on our schedule, after the doctor's visit and the sonogram and a few other things that have to take place. So we're probably talking about midday, you know, noonish.

So I'm just going to put that out there now, and we can talk about it later so we can get everything together.

Okay. Government has a rebuttal case?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. The
government asks permission to call Mr. Flax in
rebuttal. There were some issues that the
government believes is necessary to present a

rebuttal case on, that occurred during the testimony of Miss Williams in defense, and it will be brief. We would ask permission to call -- recall Mr. Flax to the witness stand.

THE COURT: Okay. And on the representation that it relates to matters that are directly connected to Miss Williams's expert testimony, I will permit the rebuttal case. If it doesn't relate to that, I'll entertain a motion to strike.

But then there's time that was requested by the defense with respect to Miss Williams's exhibit.

MR. LINSIN: Yes, your Honor. We -- we will need some period of time to be able to run back to the hotel and get these adjustments made in this chart consistent with our discussion previously today.

THE COURT: Well, what if we broke until 1:00 o'clock and then we put the government on.

I'll make this the jury's lunch break. And then we'll go for as long as it takes, and then we'll figure out what to do with the rest of the day and tomorrow.

I'm somewhat inclined to do this. The charge is long. We've got a few things to resolve. I'm

not overwhelmed by what I think timewise it's going to take, because most of it seems to be breakdown in terms of the counts of the indictment and some add-ons. It's kind of a yea or a nay on what's added or not. I don't think that will take forever.

But the stock charge itself, that portion that doesn't relate to the specifics of the counts and the elemental aspects of it, I'm wondering if you -- I'd like to break it up into the stock portion of the charge and then the substantive -- what I'll call the substantive portion of the charge. Because otherwise, to read it, it would take a day, basically.

I wouldn't -- I mean, I would consider reading the stock portion today, recessing -- this is after the government's case -- for the morning tomorrow, complete the substantive reading tomorrow afternoon, and then have closing arguments and deliberations start on Wednesday. Or, you know, depending on how long it takes, I don't mind starting the closing arguments tomorrow afternoon if you're ready.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, this is not something I've discussed with Mr. Personius. The

Court's proposal takes me a little by surprise.

But my experience has been that the summations,

closing arguments, are given prior to the Court's

charge to the jury. That would be my preference if

the Court is amenable to that procedure.

I don't know what the Court's normal practice is. I'm cognizant of the difficulty in terms of scheduling all of this, but we believe, especially in a case like this where -- where there are some significant legal issues that are unusual and that we believe are important for the Court to -- for the jurors to have in mind, that that clarification be provided following summations rather than prior to summations.

THE COURT: Well, I do it both ways, and a lot of times it's -- frankly, it's scheduling driven. And, you know, usually the charge that relates to the substantive portion of the charge, when I talk to the jury I'll -- you know, I tell them that is the law that's going to apply. If you hear anything different from the attorneys, you go with what I give you, what you've heard, that kind of thing. But, I mean, it works both ways.

If we were to follow your recommendation, what we're really talking about, then, is closing

arguments, and the way we do it here is the government proceeds first, followed by the defendant, and then time to reserve for rebuttal.

Is the government ready to argue today?

MR. MANGO: No, your Honor.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, we had anticipated anticipated -- perhaps it was -- we had anticipated that -- that we would have a charge conference on a number of these issues, we were expecting, at some point this afternoon. I understand they are not overwhelming, but the points that we had raised in our submission yesterday we believe are very important both to the charge itself and then to shaping the arguments based on what we know the charge is going to be. So clarification on those issues would be important to us before being prepared to -- to sum up.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, just if I can clarify my earlier -- preparation is a relative term. I could, obviously, give a closing argument if necessary today, you Honor. But in light of the amount of preparation I'd like to do, I would ask that -- and I actually think the Court's recommendation makes sense in this case, so that there's no lost time. And I would -- I would

presume that the Court is planning to give the jury a copy of the charge? Is that --

THE COURT: I do at the end of the case, but I don't tell them that until after the completed charge, because I really want them to focus on what I have to say.

MR. MANGO: Right. But I think that would -- that would clarify or assist in resolving if there were any legal issues or clarification that needed to happen based on the -- the closings by the attorneys. The jury would then have that as a resource.

But I do agree that it would make sense in this case to close and then let the jury start deliberating, which -- which would best happen on Wednesday.

THE COURT: Well, let me suggest something else. Let me still suggest opening with the -- or this afternoon, perhaps, delivering the stock portion of the charge, I mean, that's going to take a little bit of time as well. Have our charge conference tomorrow morning when we're down, work through everything, and then I can work on the final part of the substantive charge following the charge conference, and then we could have closing

arguments start in the afternoon tomorrow.

MR. PERSONIUS: And then, your Honor, do the substantive part of the charge on Wednesday?

THE COURT: After the closing arguments.

MR. PERSONIUS: For whatever value it has,
I strongly prefer that as much of the charge as you
think is appropriate follow closing argument rather
than precede it.

THE COURT: Mr. Linsin.

MR. LINSIN: That is my preference. And the only request I would make, your Honor -- I'm not quite sure where the dividing line is for the Court on the stock charge. I did have, in going through this, a couple of comments I don't believe in any way controversial or time-consuming, but I'd just like the chance to review my notes, which I have with me here, if we were going to proceed with the stock charge this afternoon, just so that I could confirm that there's nothing I didn't want to raise in that regard.

THE COURT: Well, yeah. There will be time for that. All right.

MR. LINSIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And, no, I didn't mean to preclude any discussion, but, basically, I would

give the jury the first 53 pages as it's now proposed, and that would be up to the discussion of the Clean Air Act. That is where I consider the charge to turn from stock to substantive.

MR. LINSIN: Okay.

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

We would just ask that if we do closings in the afternoon, that all the closings happen in one afternoon and not, you know, be broken up into -- into the day. I'm just concerned that we give our closing and then they have the evening to weigh our closing and then -- you know, based on time constraints. So that would be my concern, if we're going to do closing in an afternoon, we do -- you know, if we need limited breaks. Obviously, I see Michelle's face. I would just want all the closings to occur in one period of time.

THE COURT: If we went over to the next day for rebuttal, you wouldn't be opposed to that.

MR. MANGO: Well -- well, your Honor, I would actually prefer it happen all in one day, actually.

THE COURT: All right. How -- you've -- probably you're semi-ready to argue. But approximately how long?

MR. MANGO: I'm putting it at about an hour, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Mr. Linsin, do you have an idea?

MR. LINSIN: Yes. I feel I need to limit myself to 45 minutes, your Honor, and I think I can do that.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Personius?

MR. PERSONIUS: My hope is, Judge, about a half an hour.

THE COURT: All right. I don't see any problem then, if we start at, say, noon, all right. Because I'll tell the jury to become -- to come here fortified, so -- which means they can intake lunch before they get here. We'll start somewhere around noonish. That will give everybody time to adequately argue their respective cases, we'll have times for breaks, and then, depending on what time it is, we can either complete or start the substantive charge or start on Wednesday with the -- what I call the substantive charge, beginning with the Clean Air Act and whatever we decide after tomorrow's charge conference. And then we'd start the deliberations on Wednesday.

And I take a little bit of time. You know,

I -- right now, the charge, as you know, is a little over 115 pages or so. But I will -- bless you -- I will walk the jury through the Clean Air Act and the elements, and then we try to take a couple of breaks, and I just don't want them to become in their own minds overwhelmed by everything.

I mean, you'll see a sigh of relief -- I'm sure you all experience this -- when I tell them they get the charge in written form. But, you know, I'll work with them as if they're going to get it only orally, and until that time when we break the news that they get the written version.

If I see that they're really panicking or at least I sense that, I may tell them, "I'll give you the written charge, but just stay focused with what I'm doing." We'll see how that works. Okay?

That's my intention. If you have any problem with that, let me know, and I'll reconsider. But that's basically the way I like to proceed.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ LINSIN:}$$ We agree that makes perfect sense, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: We're comfortable with that, Judge. Thank you.

MR. MANGO: Likewise with the government.

THE COURT: Okay. We ate up about ten minutes, so let's have the jury come back about 1:15 then, and then we'll start with the government's case, and then I'll tell the jury that I will be giving them a part of -- of the instruction this afternoon. And then we'll break. It shouldn't -- they should probably get an early break today. And then we'll start as we discussed tomorrow morning. Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, if we could, please, factor in to what you're planning for today an opportunity, which I think will be brief, to raise just a couple of issues with you about your standard charge. They're not controversial, but I think it will be quick.

THE COURT: Okay. No, that's fine. And if we get them here at 1:15, we'll begin with the government's redirect case, we will finish that up, we'll break, we'll talk about whatever you think is appropriate as far as the standard or stock charge, and then we'll go from there.

MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going call the jury back now, and we'll give them the break, and I'll

explain to them what they face for the day. And I'm going to mention tomorrow, too, because they should know that tomorrow they won't start until noon, or hopefully as close to noon as we can get Miss Majerowski back.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Okay. Welcome back, and I'm going give you what we usually call the home stretch lecture. So have a seat.

Okay. Jury is back, roll call waived. The attorneys and parties are back present.

Here's where we are, ladies and gentlemen.

We're going to send you out for an early lunch, and we're going to try to resume about 1:15, okay. At that time -- as you know, the defense has rested its case. They do not intend to call any additional witnesses or produce any additional evidence. The government gets the opportunity to call a rebuttal witness. They have one witness that I understand is reasonably short. That will take place this afternoon on your return from lunch.

After that we're going to take a break, and when we resume I will start what we call the preliminary instruction to you with respect to the

deliberation charge, which will include some general instructions and definitions and the like, and then eventually we get to giving you the specifics on the law and the definitions to be applied.

Some of the terms that we talk about, like burden of proof and presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I'll talk about those with you this afternoon. I'm going to break it up a little bit, because there's a fairly lengthy charge or instruction in the law that comes with the case and which I need to give you before you can actually begin your deliberations. So you get that.

Tomorrow we will resume at approximately

12:00 o'clock. And in part -- I think you probably know Miss Majerowski has a doctor's appointment, and when she gets back we're going to start. And at noon or thereabouts we will have the closing arguments. And you will hear from the attorneys. They will give you their closing arguments. We hope to complete all three of them in -- tomorrow afternoon.

There then remains a part of the instruction in the law that I still have to give to you, and I

will complete that with you. And once that's complete, then you will begin your deliberations, and we'll get you all set up for that.

So that's what you have to look forward to, you know, so we're talking Wednesday morning by the time we either start deliberations or complete the charge on the law to you. Okay. You'll be down tomorrow morning, and then, you know, the real business begins where we get down to deciding this case with a unanimous verdict on the 19 counts of this indictment.

So we're almost there, but we've got to keep your minds open. No discussion, no research, no anything. And then you come back, and once you start your deliberations, you know, that's when you will be asked to designate or elect your foreperson if you choose to do it that way. And that person will preside over your deliberations, and I'll give you the instructions on how to conduct those in summary fashion, but it's basically what, common sense, experience intelligence.

You'll get the exhibits. You'll have those to review. And we'll do whatever we can to assist you so that you can get to that unanimous verdict in this case, because, obviously, nobody knows this

case like all of you. And you've been terrific in that regard.

You'll get to see us here for the duration of whatever time it takes, although Mr. Glasner, Ariel Glasner, who's here, and you know who he is, he's sitting up against the wall, he has a personal matter that he will be attending to for a few days, so he will not be here, but I think everybody else will.

And that's where we're at. So, you know, we're relying on you to resolve the case as you stated at the time that we started that you would make your very best effort to do that unanimously in this case.

So that we can get everything together and get ready, you get an early lunch. We'll see you back here at what time? Did I cover everything or -- yes? Okay. Okay. So we will see you at 1:15, and have a good lunch. Beautiful day. And be anxious to get back here. Thank you.

(Jury excused from the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. 1:15.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

(Lunch recess was taken.)

(Jury not present in the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. The attorneys and parties are back present. The jury is back. We're ready to call them in. But how are we doing in terms of the exhibit? Mr. Linsin.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, we have revised the exhibit in accordance with a -- the discussion this morning, but also in accordance with a draft transcript of Miss Williams' testimony regarding this fuel issue. That entry now regarding fuel reads as follows: "Used to make a fuel or used as a fuel unless that fuel is a nonwaste fuel."

And we believe that -- it's not literally -- some of it is verbatim, some of it is -- is a condensing of several different answers, but we believe that accomplishes the objective. We've made it a neutral background, and the heading now reads "Marcia Williams' opinions regarding what materials are regulated as waste under RCRA in this case."

THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- can I take a look at it? Miss Henderson, would you publish that, please?

Okay. Mr. Mango.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, my concern -- and

I defer to the Court, obviously, but my concern is now we're making substantive changes into the white box, when -- I mean, the whole -- part of the rebuttal case is to -- was to point out that there was some clear errors in the white box. You know, not necessarily the testimony, but the white box. So now we've got an exhibit that is in a much different form than what the jury saw it originally.

I mean, obviously, that is consistent with what she testified though. I have reviewed this partial transcript. So, you know, I just point it out that it seems like now the jury is going to get this version of this chart that they're not going to be familiar with. I mean, we'll still be prepared. We still have enough on rebuttal to talk about. That's the only point I make.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. What I will do -- and I do think it's clearly helpful. I don't think that the jury will be misled by the fine-tuning of this particular exhibit. And I am going to permit it under 611.

I guess -- is that over objection?

MR. MANGO: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And

correspondingly, then, the government's exhibit -- do you have a number for it?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. 212. And at the lunch break I added a sharper version of that, and I gave it to Miss Labuzzetta, which is right there. So --

THE COURT: Okay. And you agree,
Mr. Linsin, that it's a sharper version of 212?

MR. LINSIN: It is a sharper version. The only point I made, it is a -- I understand there may be space issues, but for purposes of clarification with the jury, I understand Mr. Flax would be testifying about this, but much as we have designated our exhibit as reflecting Marcia Williams' opinions, I think it would be helpful if this exhibit somewhere indicated that these reflect Mr. Flax's opinions. That was the only request I had made of the government, and I believe it's reasonably parallel.

THE COURT: Can you do that?

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I think it's going to be obviously clear from the testimony that this is — these are his opinions. I just hesitate, one, based on space, and, two, it took some working to try to get it into the sharper format, to be

ready to present here this afternoon.

Maybe we can just see how the testimony comes in and see if it is very clear, based on the testimony, that these are his opinions as to, you know, the RCRA issues in play in this case. I think the testimony then would stand for itself.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, I'll let you work with it. If we can entitle it his opinions before the exhibit goes to the jury, I think that would be acceptable. Mr. Linsin?

MR. LINSIN: That fine, your Honor. No problem.

MR. PERSONIUS: And, your Honor, I think what could be done, if it can't be done -- we're so used to doing things these days with computers and things -- somebody with good penmanship, in the white at the top could simply handwrite in there with a Magic marker that is Mr. Flax's opinion.

THE COURT: Or, you know, we could -- we could put a -- a label on it. But we'll give that some thought. But, you know, it does limp a little bit just because it doesn't have some title designation to it. So -- but 212 will be received into evidence. There's no objection, I understand.

MR. LINSIN: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, it is -- I hope it is clarifying or helpful. There is a lot on there, but it is sharp, so we'll leave it at that. And as I mentioned, I will receive 0000 into evidence, and there's no objection.

So, okay. Substantial progress. I think we can then call the jury back and start with your rebuttal case witness.

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Please, Chris.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. Please have a seat.

Okay. I think against the backdrop of the explanation that I gave you before you broke for the early lunch, thank you very much for coming back here timely. We are ready to proceed. The attorneys and parties are back present. You are here, of course, roll call waived.

The defense case is finished. They believe that you have everything you need now to decide the case for the defendants. The government believes that it has given you sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish their case against

the defendants, but the government does in this scenario get the opportunity to present a rebuttal case, so to speak, if it complies with the rules, and I found that it did. So there is one more witness, not a -- we think, not a long witness.

And the government is ready to do that.

Once that is complete, then I'll give you further instructions on how we're going to go forward.

Mr. Mango, you have another witness?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. In rebuttal the government would call Phil Flax.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, you have heard from Mr. Flax before, but in this scenario he amounts to witness number 30 by my count, so --

All right. We're going to have you stand right about there, Mr. Flax. Thank you.

P H I L I P F L A X, having been duly sworn as a witness, testified as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. I think you know the drill, but, again, you now are under oath. You've testified before. You have been here in the courtroom. I'm going to ask you now to state your full name, spell your last name, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is Philip Flax,

F-L-A-X.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mango, your witness.

MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Flax.
- A. Good afternoon, sir.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, based on
Mr. Flax's earlier testimony in this trial
regarding his background, his education, his
knowledge of RCRA and its implementing regulations,
I ask that Mr. Flax continue to be viewed as an
expert in that area, and I again offer him to the
Court as an expert in a way to streamline this
rebuttal case.

THE COURT: All right. And his testimony really is going to be directed, as I understand it, to the testimony of the defense expert, Marcia Williams.

MR. MANGO: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Unless there's an objection, I'm going to proffer Mr. Flax once again as the government's expert as articulated, but primarily in RCRA.

MR. LINSIN: No objection, your Honor.

MR. PERSONIUS: No objection. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, remember that -- and you've heard and seen Mr. Flax before -- expert witnesses -- and you will have an opportunity to ask questions if you will -- or choose to, because he is being entered as an expert. You assess his believability, his credibility, just as you would any other witness on the same criteria factors. But keep in mind he has a special knowledge and expertise based on study, experience, work history and the like, in particularly the RCRA statute. So -- and procedures.

Go ahead, Mr. Mango.

MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Mr. Flax, did you have an opportunity to listen to the testimony of Miss Williams?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. And were there any parts of that testimony that you agreed with?
 - A. Some.
 - Q. Okay. Were there any parts of that testimony you that you did not agree with?

A. Yes, there were.

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- Q. Okay. I'd like to start with some items you may have agreed with. Did you hear her testimony regarding spills and leakage?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. All right. Was there any portion of that testimony that you agreed with?
- A. Yes, there was.
 - Q. Okay. Tell the jury what that was.
- A. I agreed that inadvertent spills and leakage
 were those spills that were done by personnel,
 accidental spills when they were taking every
 precaution to try to prevent those spills, and
 those types of spills are immediately cleaned up
 and any residual contamination is removed.
 - Q. All right. Are you familiar with Tonawanda

 Coke's practice of placing K087 waste onto the coal
 piles on the ground?
 - A. Yes, I am.
 - Q. All right. And as a result of that practice,
 would you characterize any releases containing K087
 waste as an inadvertent activity?
- 23 A. No, I would not.
 - Q. Okay. Tell the jury why.
- 25 A. I wouldn't because I believe that, in my

opinion, the practice of taking K087 tar sludge and placing it on coal in the coal piles on the grounds was a deliberate action that allowed for the uncontained, uncontrolled, and unremediated release of contamination to the environment.

- Q. All right. Mr. Flax, did you hear

 Miss Williams's testimony regarding the purposes of

 RCRA?
- A. Yes, I did.

- Q. All right. And what is your understanding of the purposes of RCRA?
 - A. The purpose of RCRA are twofold. The first is to protect human health in the environment through the proper management of hazardous waste. And the second is resource recovery and conservation; in other words, reuse, recycling, and the reduction of wastes.
 - Q. All right. Can you tell the jury whether any of those -- if one of those purposes takes precedence over the other?
- A. Yes, of course. The protection of human health in the environment takes precedence over everything else. All other considerations are secondary.
- Q. All right. During Miss Williams's testimony did you have an opportunity to observe the chart

she used during her testimony, which is Defendant's 0000?

A. Yes, I did.

- Q. And have you had a chance to review Defendant's 0000 before now testifying here today?
- A. Yes, I did.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I'd like to pull up Defendant's 0000 at this point.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mango, go ahead, please. There's no objection? Yes.

MR. LINSIN: No objection, your Honor.

And is this an appropriate time to resolve its

admission, the matter I had understood, at least on
the record last week, was still open?

MR. MANGO: No objection now, your Honor.

I understand the Court is inclined to admit this
into evidence, and we have no objection.

THE COURT: All right. It is now received into evidence, and it may be considered by you, ladies and gentlemen. It has been designated the summary chart, if you will, of the opinions of the defense expert, Marcia Williams, with respect to, as designated, waste under RCRA in this case. So, you know, you are to view it as that, for purposes of assisting you in understanding the evidence

that's relevant to the RCRA counts in the indictment no this case. So this is now an exhibit received into evidence, and it may be published for your review.

(Defendants' Exhibit 0000 was received into evidence.)

MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Mr. Flax, do you see that Defendant's 0000 on the screen?
- A. Yes, I do.
 - Q. All right. How would you characterize -- do you see the white box in the middle of the exhibit?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. How would you characterize the information contained in this white box?
 - A. Well, it's incomplete in some respects, and it's missing at least one critical factor that, in my opinion, needs to be taken into account when you consider whether material recycled is a solid waste.
 - Q. Okay. I want you to tell the jury -- this critical factor you believe is missing here, why don't you tell the jury a little bit more about that.

A. The section of the regulations for recycling materials that states, "Materials are solid waste when recycled when they are applied to or placed on the land -- on the land in a manner that constitutes disposal." And that is entirely missing from the white box in this figure.

THE COURT: Where should that go, in your opinion?

THE WITNESS: That should go right on top of "used on the land," sir.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Okay. So that is -- that is missing in this white box?
- A. Yes, it is.
- Q. Now, in a manner -- I think you mentioned, "applied to or placed on the land in a manner constituting disposal."
- A. That's correct.
- Q. In your understanding of disposal under RCRA, can you tell the jury what that is?
- A. Disposal under RCRA is the placement of solid waste, hazardous waste, or hazardous materials onto or into the land in a manner that allows the release of that solid waste, hazardous waste, or

hazardous constituents, which are basically the chemicals that make something hazardous, into the environment.

- Q. Okay. So for disposal purposes, is that the key, that the material may enter the environment?
- Q. Okay. Now, in light of -- I think you also mentioned that you believe this was incomplete. In light of your belief that Defendant's 0000 is incomplete, did you prepare any charts of your own for use today?
- A. Yes, I did.

Correct.

Α.

- Q. All right. And what type of chart -- if you could tell the jury, what type of chart did you prepare?
- A. I prepared a chart that, in my opinion, tries to demonstrate the steps one would take to determine whether something is a solid and a hazardous waste. I've limited the information to the things that I believe are applicable to the situation at Tonawanda Coke, and then I've made three little decision trees to try and show how that information is applicable to the RCRA counts that are contained in the criminal indictments.

MR. MANGO: All right. At this point,

your Honor, I'd like to show the witness Government Exhibit 212. And based on our earlier conversation and understanding the Court's ruling, I would move this into evidence.

THE COURT: Yeah. There's no objection, is my understanding. It will bear with it probably

is my understanding. It will bear with it probably a descriptive title when you next see this particular exhibit, ladies and gentlemen. But it will be received. No objection, Mr. Linsin?

MR. LINSIN: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Personius?

MR. PERSONIUS: No objection, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. And it may be published. And the RCRA counts in this indictment are 17, 18 and 19.

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Government's Exhibit 212 was received into evidence.)

MR. MANGO: Yes, it is published. Great. BY MR. MANGO:

- Q. Mr. Flax, do you see this document, now Government Exhibit 212 in evidence, on your screen?
- 24 A. Yes, I do.

Q. Okay. Why did you create this chart?

- A. I created this chart to try to explain to the jury in as simple a way I could how you determine whether materials from Tonawanda Coke are solid waste and how that relates to the counts in the indictment.
- Q. Okay. Is it your belief that this chart will aid the jury in understanding the RCRA concepts relating to Counts 17, 18 and 19?
- A. I certainly hope so.
- Q. All right. Now, let's start with the box in the upper left, which says "Definition of solid waste, number 1." Can you describe for the jury, using reference to that box and if you need to touch the screen, please do so, add dots. Describe for the jury how a material becomes a solid waste.
- A. According to what I have in this box, materials become a solid waste when they are discarded by being either abandoned or recycled in certain ways.
- Q. All right. And abandoned -- you have two bullet points underneath abandoned?
- A. Yes.

- Q. Could you talk about that briefly?
- A. Well, abandoned by being disposed or by being accumulated, stored, or treated in lieu of or -- in lieu of being abandoned.

Q. Okay. Now, "Recycled in certain ways based on the type of material." You have three bullet points there?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you talk a little bit more about the bullet points you included under this recycling part?

A. Right. Well, the first is "Applied to or placed on the land in a manner that constitutes disposal." That's what we just talked about when things are applied to the land in a manner so that contamination can enter the environment.

The second, I put that down just to show,
because when I was listening to Miss Williams's
testimony, she gave an example of something that's
used to -- used on the land. I think what she
meant to say was used to produce a product that is
used on the land, if I'm not incorrect, because she
used the example of a fertilizer. And this is the
section of the regulation that applies to that.

The other, "Used to produce a fuel," using that because I believe that is -- directly pertains to the situation at Tonawanda Coke.

Q. All right. And we'll talk about that in a minute in more detail.

Now, you've -- just if you could just briefly

walk the jury through the other two boxes on the right-hand top part of this page.

- A. Sure. Box number 2 contains the exclusion from being a solid waste that is specific to wastes from the coking processes. There are about 25 of these specific exclusions in the regulations. This is the only one that applies to waste products from coking operations.
- Q. And then underneath it there's a box number 3. What is that?
- A. Right. After you determine if something is a solid waste, then you have to determine whether it's a hazardous waste. And, of course, you do it in two ways, and I condensed this, because they could be separate. You do it first by trying to identify it as a listed waste. And listed waste, as I know you've heard a hundred times, are those things that are specifically identified in the regulations. They each have numbers associated with them. Or you determine if that waste exhibits a characteristic, like ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or, in this case, toxicity.
- Q. All right. And just describe in general terms the bottom half of this exhibit, what -- what that contains.

A. Well, I produced the decision tree that — where you'd follow along to see if something was a solid waste and then a hazardous waste and then subject to regulation, trying to make it as simple to possible. It's a way to use the information in the three upper boxes to make a decision about the nature of the material and the RCRA requirements involved.

- Q. Okay. All right. Let's start with Count 17 here. What is your understanding of Count 17 of the indictment?
- A. My understanding of Count 17 is that it alleges storage of hazardous waste on the ground in the area around the two Barrett tanks. Storage without a permit.
- Q. All right. And now you've got your decision tree here. Why don't we walk through that, if we could.
- A. Sure. The first box you look at is, "Is the material on the ground a solid waste?" So you go to box number 1, and there is a stipulation that the Court and all the parties and the Court have agreed, that that material was abandoned. So you go no further. Since that material was abandoned, you follow the yes arrow down, because now you know

it is a solid waste, and you look and you try to determine is it a hazardous waste.

- Q. And take the jury through the next step of your decision tree.
- A. In determining whether or not the material is a hazardous waste, I reviewed analytical data from September and December of 2009 that was taken of this material, and I found that the samples indicated that this material was a toxic hazardous waste because it exceeded the regulatory level for benzene. So, yes, it is a hazardous waste.

The next step is to determine if the material was actively managed. In 1998 Tonawanda Coke applied coke breeze to these piles around the Barrett tanks. In my mind, that was enough to make this material actively managed. Therefore, what's happening is you have a hazardous waste in an area that's being actively managed. That activity requires a RCRA storage permit, and Tonawanda Coke did not have one.

- Q. Okay. All right. Let's go through Count 18. What is your understanding of Count 18 of the indictment?
- A. Count 18 involves the removal of waste from the Barrett tanks and its mixing -- dumping and mixing

with coal on the ground. And the allegation is that that activity required a RCRA disposal permit.

Q. All right. So let's walk through the decision tree you created for that.

A. Well, the first thing you do is you try to -you go to box number 1, and you see and try to
decide if this material is a solid waste. And you
look and you see that, first of all, the material
is not abandoned, because it's being recycled. And
then you look in "recycled in certain ways," and
you see if something applies to that. And, in my
opinion, two things do apply, but the most -- the
first one, "applied to or placed on the land in a
manner that constitutes disposal," in my opinion,
that applies to this material. But also the third
one, it was used to produce a fuel. So there's two
criteria there to indicate to me that this material
is a solid waste.

Then the next step, you look at box number 2, because some solid wastes have specific -waste-specific exclusions. So if you handle it in a certain way, it comes out of the solid waste field. The exclusion for coke waste reads, K087 -- and it's paraphrased a little bit -- "K087 and D018 from coke by-products processes are excluded from

the definition of solid waste when recycled to coke ovens."

And here's the big point: "Conditioned on there being no land disposal" -- "no land disposal from the point they are generated to the point they are recycled to the coke ovens."

Now, it is my opinion that the mixing of the decanter tank tar sludge and the mixing of the materials taken out of the Barrett tanks on the coal on the ground constituted land disposal, and a definition of which is going to be supplied to you by the Court.

That opinion differs very much, and it's the main point — there is a lot of points where I differ from Miss Williams's testimony. This is the main point where I differ from Miss Williams. I believe that this material is subject to full regulation. Otherwise, why would you need the second part of this regulation that says "conditioned on there be no land disposal from the point it is generated to the point where it's actually introduced back into the coke ovens"? Wouldn't be necessary.

I believe the mixing procedure utilized at Tonawanda Coke makes any eligibility for this

exclusion null and void. The material is subject to full regulation. And being that it is, the next step I take in this little decision tree is to see if it's a hazardous waste.

Well, once again, this material, there were samples taken in September and December of 2009, and those samples indicate that it was toxic for benzene. Therefore, that material is a hazardous waste.

- Q. Okay. And as a result of that, what is your opinion --
- A. The land disposal -- the disposal -- excuse

 me -- the disposal of hazardous waste as alleged in

 the indictment requires a permit, a permit under

 RCRA, and Tonawanda Coke Corporation had no such

 permit.

THE COURT: Are we talking K087?

THE WITNESS: No. Right now, your Honor, I'm talking D018 that was taken out of the Barrett tanks.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANGO: That's Count 18, your Honor.
BY MR. MANGO:

Q. Okay. Let's talk now about -- let me go back. In that description of your decision tree for

- 1 Count 18, I'm going to put a little point there.
- 2 You said "used to produce a fuel." Is it your
- 3 opinion that coke is a fuel?
- 4 A. It's my opinion, based on everything I've
- 5 heard, yes.
- 6 Q. Okay. All right. Can you tell the jury what
- 7 your understanding of Count 19 is? Just your
- 8 understanding.
- 9 A. Count 19 alleges legal disposal -- well, excuse
- 10 me. It alleges disposal of hazardous waste without
- 11 a permit as related to the practice at Tonawanda
- 12 Coke of removing K087 from the tank and applying it
- 13 with coal on the grounds.
- 14 \parallel Q. Okay. This is the K087 waste into the tar box,
- is that right?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 \| Q. And brought to the coalfield?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. Walk the jury through maybe a similar
- 20 \parallel analysis to the earlier count, but if so, just --
- 21 you don't need to repeat yourself, but walk the
- $22 \parallel$ jury through the decision tree for Count 19.
- 23 A. Sure. The first step, once again you go to box
- 24 number 1, materials not being abandoned, is being
- 25 recycled in a certain way. And it is, in my

opinion, being used to produce a fuel and applied to or placed on the land. So, in my opinion, this material is a solid waste.

Then you go to box number 2, and the same argument. This is an exclusion, a specific exclusion for these wastes. And if this material had not been mixed on the land, it -- it would be eligible for the exclusion. However, the fact that they did mix this material on the land with the coal makes them ineligible for this exclusion.

Therefore, I go to the next box, and I ask myself, is this hazardous waste? K087 is a hazardous waste, a listed hazardous waste under RCRA. So, therefore, the disposal of this material requires a permit under RCRA, and Tonawanda Coke had no such permit.

- Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Flax. Did you hear Miss Williams's testimony regarding land-based production units?
- A. Yes, I did.

- Q. All right. Have you become familiar with what land-based production units are?
- A. Well, I did try to make myself familiar with them, because I really had never heard the term before. So I did a little research, yes.

- Q. Have you done a fair amount of research since you've last testified?
- A. Yes, I have.

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- Q. All right. What is your understanding of what a land-based production unit is?
- The land-based production units that are recognized by EPA are restricted to the example that Miss Williams gave on the stand, and that is gold heap leaching and copper dump leaching. And these are production activities that take place right on the land and are limited to the mining industry. And EPA has elected not to regulate those activities because -- well, they don't occur around here -- because they felt that the state authorities in Nevada, where it does occur, are sufficient to handle any problems that might result from that. And they also felt that any necessary cleanup or any other means necessary to address any contamination resulting from the operation of these types of units could be performed under either the Clean Water Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act. That's why they elected not to regulate them under RCRA.
- Q. Okay. So it's your testimony land-based production units apply only to something that is

physically and actually produced on the land?

- A. Yes. That is the only way to do this very restricted type of operation.
- Q. Do you believe that the concept of land-based production units has any relevance to Count 18 or 19 of this indictment?
- A. None whatsoever, in my opinion.
- Q. And tell the jury why.
- A. Well, because coke is produced in a coke oven.
- Q. Did you hear Miss Williams's testimony regarding a continuous production process?
- 12 | A. Yes, I did.

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- Q. And is there any definition of "continuous production process" in the RCRA regulations?
- 15 A. No, there is not.
 - Q. All right. What is your understanding of what a continuous production process is under RCRA?
 - A. A continuous production process under RCRA is a situation where you would take the waste from the point where it is generated and immediately, in a safe manner, transport it back to be introduced right into the production process. No storage, no other activity in between that. That is my understanding.
 - Q. And what do you -- or I'm sorry. Do you

believe that the concept of continuous production process has any relevance to Count 18 or Count 19 of this indictment?

A. None whatsoever, in my opinion.

Q. Okay. Tell the jury why.

A. Because the operations conducted at Tonawanda

Coke were not continuous in nature. Material was
either taken from -- the K087 was either taken from
the tar tank or the material was taken from the

Barrett tanks, and it wasn't immediately
reintroduced into the coke ovens. It was mixed

with coal on the ground in the coalfields. There

was no way in the world that this is a continuous
production process.

MR. MANGO: Thank you, Mr. Flax. Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mango. Thank you.
Mr. Linsin.

MR. LINSIN: May I proceed, your Honor?

THE COURT: You may proceed.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. LINSIN:

- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Flax.
- A. Good afternoon, sir.
 - Q. We've not spoken since you testified last, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

- Q. Mr. Flax, you've changed a number of the opinions you expressed since you last testified here, haven't you?
- A. I don't believe that's true, no.
- Q. Do you recall when you testified here, if I have it correctly, on Thursday, March the 14th, and you were asked some questions about the K087 material, that you testified that because this was a listed hazardous waste under RCRA, there was no need to be concerned at all or to analyze at all whether it was a solid waste? Do you recall testifying that way?
- A. Yeah.
- Q. All right. But now in the decision tree you have provided on this Government Exhibit number 212, you now concede, I guess, that it is important and necessary that you first determine whether that material is a solid waste, is that correct?
 - A. What I believe is that the uninitiated or the unexperienced need to go through this procedure.
 - Q. The un -- isn't -- isn't it explicitly required in the regulations -- not just for the uninitiated or the inexperienced, isn't it explicitly required

in the regulations, the hazardous waste regulations under RCRA, that you first determine whether the material is a solid waste?

- A. That is a procedure that is specified in the regulations. But when I or one of my inspectors go out to a facility and we inquire of the facility the materials that they generate, or we familiarize ourselves with the types of waste, beforehand, that a facility generates, I think we've got a jump start on how we view the process.
- Q. Let me ask the question again. You may have a jump start, and your experience may well help you in the analysis, but isn't it true that before you reach any decisions about whether material or activity regarding material requires a permit, you must first determine whether it is a solid waste under RCRA? Isn't that correct?
- A. Something has to be a solid waste to be a hazardous waste. If that's what you mean, yes.
- Q. And when you testified here just 11 days ago, you said that you didn't have to be concerned about whether K087 was a solid waste, because it's a listed hazardous waste, and you go straight to that analysis. Isn't that what you said?
- A. That's what I would do, sir, yes.

- Q. But you've now modified that so we can incorporate this important decision-making process on your chart, correct?
- A. I've modified this chart to try to explain in the most simple way to the jury how you could come about the conclusions that I have come to.
- Q. And the way you now have this provided, at least the decisions are consistent with actually what is required under the regulations, correct?
- A. These are the decisions I would have come to if I didn't start at the point that you are indicating.
 - Q. You also testified last time, did you not, that you thought there was one disposal count charged in this case, correct?
 - A. At the time you were asking me questions about one particular situation, and my testimony at that time was regarding that explicit event. Yes.
 - Q. Well, Mr. Flax, didn't you testify that it was your understanding that there was one disposal count charged in this case that related to K087?
- A. Yes. I was not familiar with the indictment.

 That's correct.
 - Q. All right. You have testified, as I heard you, repeatedly, that one of the fundamental differences

that you have with Miss Williams's testimony is that you believe that the mixture of this, either the K087 or the D018, on the coal piles, in your testimony, on the ground, constituted land disposal, is that correct?

A. Correct.

- Q. Since you last testified, have you done anything to inform yourself about what the material was that was beneath these coal piles out at Tonawanda Coke?
- A. I've listened to whatever testimony I sat in the courtroom and heard what individuals had to say about it. Yes.
- Q. Did you hear what Gerry Priamo had to say -not had to say. Did you hear what Gerry Priamo
 testified was underneath these coal piles?
- A. No. I was not in the courtroom for that.
- Q. Has anyone advised you that Mr. Priamo, who had substantial experience in this coalfield, testified that the coal underneath these coal piles was anywhere from 3 to 6 feet deep? Did you hear that?

 A. I wasn't aware of it, but that's fine. Okay.
- Now I am. Yes.
- Q. All right. And you agree with me, don't you, that coal -- at least for the purposes of coking

- 1 operations, coal is a raw material, correct?
 - A. Absolutely.

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- Q. And raw materials are not regulated under RCRA, correct?
- 5 A. That's correct.
 - Q. All right. So you testified multiple times
 that -- in your direct testimony a moment ago, that
 this mixing operation occurred on coal piles that
 were on the ground. That was not correct, was it?
- 10 A. That is correct.
- Q. Are you disputing Mr. Priamo's testimony about what was beneath these coal piles?
- 13 A. No.
- Q. But you're equating 3 to 6 feet of coal with the ground. Is that what I understand?
- 16 A. Yes, I am.
- Q. All right. Even though raw material is excluded from RCRA?
- 19 A. Yes, I am.
- Q. Okay. You testified that you believe that this recycling procedure, both for the K087 and the D018, constituted land disposal, in your opinion, correct?
- 24 A. That is correct.
- 25 Q. And you believe that that was true because it

allowed for, if I took it down correctly, the uncontained, uncontrolled releases into the environment. Is that your testimony?

- A. Exactly. Yes.
- Q. Are you aware of any sampling that was done in the coalfields at Tonawanda Coke?
- A. No, I'm not.
- Q. Are you aware of the fact that Tonawanda Coke has a Clean Water Act permit?
- A. No, I'm not.
- Q. Are you aware of what the testing parameters are on a monthly basis under that facility's Clean Water Act permit?
- 14 | A. No.

- Q. Do you have any information at all to indicate or have you heard any testimony to indicate that there was at any point releases of coal tar sludge or D018 material into the environment?
- A. I have heard testimony and I've read testimony that indicated that no preventative precautions were ever taken to prevent that.
- Q. Did you ever hear the testimony -- let's start at the beginning of the process, with the material that was taken out of the tar box. Did you hear the testimony from people who had observed that

process, about how long those front-end loaders sat there so that all that material that was outside of the bucket would drip back into the box before the front-end loader traveled to the coalfield?

- A. No. No. No, I haven't.
- Q. Would you believe that would have been important for you to understand?
- A. No, I don't.

- Q. Would you agree with me that that is a prudent and valuable precaution to take to make sure that none of this material just dribbles onto the ground?
- A. Could you explain the process that relates to this again, in terms of the front loader?
 - Q. Sure. I'm sorry if I my question wasn't clear. I'm talking about whether you ever heard testimony from anyone or whether anyone ever advised you that when this material was removed from the tar box, scooped out of the tar box, that the front-end loader would actually sit there and idle in front of the tar box so that any of the material that might be on the outside of the bucket would drip back into the tar box before the front-end loader actually moved to travel to the coalfield.
- A. Well, that's very nice, but I'm more concerned

with what happens when the front-end loader goes to the coalfields and dumps the tar.

- Q. We'll get there. But my question is, first of all, did you hear that testimony?
- A. No, I did not.
- Q. You were not aware of those facts?
- A. No, sir.

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- Q. All right. And have you read or seen any descriptions of what actually happened when this material was mixed with the coal on the coal piles?
- 11 A. Yes, I have.
 - Q. Whose testimony have you read?
- A. I have -- I don't remember whose, but I did
 read some short sections that dealt with that.
- 15 Q. You don't remember any names?
- A. I -- I read several people's testimony. I

 could give you the names of the people's testimony

 I read. If it's in there, that's where I saw it.
 - Q. Well, what I'm trying to understand right now,
 Mr. Flax, is what is the basis, the factual basis,
 for the opinions you're now offering. What is your
 factual basis for your understanding of what
 actually happened in this recycling process?
 - A. That there was no preventative measures, no containment or control of this coal tar when it was

dumped on and mixed with the coal on the ground.

- Q. You mean it was not performed within a box?
- A. It was not performed in a manner to prevent the uncontrolled release of contamination.
- Q. And my question -- my initial question before we got off on this track was whether you are aware of any testimony anywhere, from any person, that says that any of this material was released into the environment.
- A. I believe I saw some testimony from either Mr. Rogers or Mr. Hoffmann that indicated that no preventative controls were put in place and nobody ever told them to avoid doing anything that would cause a release of this material when it was applied to the coal.
- Q. Right. And that's now the second time you've given that answer. I'm going to repeat my question for the third time. Are you aware of any evidence, any testimony from any source, that any of this material did enter the environment?
- A. You mean from somebody who was standing there watching it? No, I'm not.
- Q. From any source, sir.
- 24 | A. No. No.

Q. You offered some testimony on Count 17 today.

I want to go back through that briefly, but am I correct that you also now have become more familiar with what the allegations are in Count 17 of the indictment since you last testified?

A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And you're aware that in the indictment, anyhow, it's alleged that this storage went back to 1998 when coke breeze was first spread on this material, is that correct?
- A. That is my understanding, yes.
 - Q. And it's your opinion that spreading of the coke breeze constituted active management and therefore this material became subject to RCRA, is that correct?
 - A. That's part of what determined my opinion, yes.
 - Q. But you also testified that you read the -- or were aware of the stipulation that before Tonawanda Coke took possession of this property that the material in the tanks and on the ground around the tanks had been abandoned by a prior owner, correct?

 A. Correct.
 - Q. So let's just look at your decision tree, as you described, it for Count 17. You indicate here that the first question you have to ask is whether the material is a solid waste. Isn't it true that

because this material that relates to Count 17 had been abandoned by a prior owner, don't you -- isn't the first question you have to ask whether or not the material was actively managed, in order to determine whether it becomes subject to RCRA?

Isn't that your first question?

- A. You could back into it that way, yes.
- Q. Isn't that the threshold question, Mr. Flax, to determine whether the material becomes subject to RCRA regulation?
- A. I believe there is a definition of active management that has been agreed upon, and it's been proffered by this Court. And I don't believe it says that in the definition, sir.
- Q. Well, there is a definition of active management, and we can get to that in a moment.

 But my question, though, really relates to how that concept of active management relates to waste that had been abandoned before the enactment of RCRA.

 Are we agreed that material that was abandoned before the enactment of RCRA is not subject to RCRA regulation unless and until it is actively managed?

 A. I agree with that, yes.
- Q. All right. So given that there is a stipulation in this case about that material, that

it had been abandoned by a prior owner prior to
'78, isn't it correct that the first question you
have to ask in order to understand whether the
material is subject to RCRA regulation -- don't you
have to first ask is the material or has it been
actively managed?

- A. That is what you need to ask to know if a permit was required. It's not what you have to ask to determine whether the material is a solid or hazardous waste.
- Q. So you believe it's subject to RCRA regulation even if it wasn't actively managed?
- A. No. I believe it to be a hazardous waste if it wasn't actively managed, but I believe that it is subject to a permit because it was actively managed.
- Q. You heard Miss Williams testify about a wide number of -- of facilities she's familiar with -- a large number of facilities she is familiar with, in which previously abandoned waste has been paved over or parking lots or even buildings put over them. Did you hear that testimony, sir?
- A. Yes, I did.

Q. Are you familiar with those kinds of management of inactive waste storage units?

A. We routinely pave over areas where soil has been contaminated by hazardous waste or hazardous constituents, because there is a structural stability. So we pave over it because the paving does two things. It puts a barrier between that contamination and people and the environment, and it also prevents the infiltration of precipitation that can drive that contamination elsewhere. But I certainly wouldn't want my daughter parking her car in a parking lot that is paved over a sludge impoundment, and I would not want to live in a building that had been built upon a basis of sludge, sir, because I don't believe there's any structural integrity to it.

- Q. I'm going to ask you, Mr. Flax, if you could confine your responses to answers that are responsive to my question.
- A. I'm sorry. I just thought I was trying to explain myself.
- Q. My question is whether you are familiar with circumstances where, consistent with RCRA regulations, inactive waste management units of material that existed pre-RCRA have been paved over or even had buildings built over them.
- A. Yes. Under the conditions that I just spoke

about.

- Q. So you are familiar with those?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. And are you familiar with the testimony that was provided by Mr. Gerry Priamo and others in this case that the purpose of spreading this breeze over the material that's on the ground was to harden the surface?
- A. I have not heard Mr. Priamo's testimony, sir.
- Q. Would you agree with me that that purpose is consistent with the overpavement that I had just described of these other inactive waste management units?
- A. No.
 - Q. The spreading of the coke breeze on this material that was on the ground, in your understanding of the facts, was that the only activity that, in your opinion, constituted active management of this material?
 - A. Well, what I read in Mr. Rogers' testimony, sir, and Mr. Hoffmann's, apparently there had been problems walking in the area because of the sludge, and apparently heavy equipment had gotten stuck in the sludge. So the coke breeze was added, it's my understanding, to that material in order to try to

avoid that situation.

- Q. To permit heavy equipment to get close to the tanks, is that correct?
- A. Yes.

- Q. All right. So, that is the activity that you believe constitutes active management?
- A. Yes, because that activity caused the waste in place to be disrupted and disturbed, and it actually caused it to migrate down gradient, according to what I've read, closer to the tanks.

 And I believe that is consistent with the definition of active management that has been developed by the Court.
- Q. Would you agree with me, or does it fit with your understanding that the definition of active management that will govern the decisions in this case reads as follows: "Physically disturbing accumulated wastes within a management unit or disposing of additional hazardous waste in existing units containing previously disposed wastes," period. "In other words, it means taking some action to disturb or disrupt contained hazardous waste or adding hazardous waste to previously contained material."

Is that your understanding of the operative

definition?

- A. Yes, it is.
- Q. And so it requires an action taken to disturb or disrupt?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And it's your view that the spreading of coke breeze on this tar to facilitate the access of heavy equipment to the tanks was an action taken to disturb or disrupt?
- A. It was an action taken that did disturb and disrupt the waste in place.
 - Q. And -- but that isn't what I just read, is it?
- A. I don't know if that's exactly what you just read.
 - Q. All right. You testified at a couple of points, I presume with regard to Counts 18 -- and it would be applicable to Counts 18 and 19, that you believe that coke is -- qualifies as a fuel under the terms used in the RCRA definition of solid waste, is that correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. All right. And if I heard you correctly, you said that you believed coke is a fuel, based on everything you've heard?
 - A. Heard and read, yes.

- Q. And what is the basis of that opinion, sir?
- A. In part, decisions that have been made interpret -- regulatory interpretations that have been made by EPA in regard to when coke, intended

to be recycling, becomes a solid waste.

- Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Flax, that EPA expressly has made the determination that coke is not a waste-derived fuel? Isn't that what EPA decided?
- A. That is true. That has nothing to do with this.
- Q. If -- if a material is determined to be a fuel under the solid waste definition, what is the consequence under this regulation?
- A. If something is recycled and in doing so is used to produce a fuel, then when it is -- it is -- it is a solid waste.
- Q. What is a solid waste?

- A. The material used to produce a fuel in this case is the tar sludge.
- Q. All right. Let me ask you if this is not consistent with your understanding of the actual language of the regulation. And I'm referencing, for the record, 216.2(c)(2)(B). And these are all materials that are that fit within the definition of solid waste under the regulations.

"Materials are solid waste when they are used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels," parentheses, "in which case the fuel itself remains a solid waste," close parentheses, period.

- A. That relates to the part of that that says "contained in fuels," not to the part that says "used to produce fuels."
- Q. And what is the factual basis for your understanding that coke is a fuel?
- A. Once again, it deals with every regulatory interpretation that any -- any policy or guidance documents that I have ever been associated with at my time in EPA.
- Q. And can you point to any RCRA regulation that identifies coke as a fuel?
- A. RCRA regulation does not identify raw ingredients, sir. It doesn't deal with raw ingredients. I think we covered that. It deals with wastes.
- Q. So RCRA doesn't define coke as a fuel?
- A. No. In the RCRA regulations coke is not defined as a fuel.
- Q. But you said, based on everything you've heard, you've concluded coke is a fuel.
 - A. Yes. And I said it was based on all the

regulatory interpretations, policy, and guidance that I have ever been associated with in all my years at EPA.

- Q. Is it fair, Mr. Flax, to summarize your disagreement with Miss Williams as follows: That you believe -- at least with respect to the D018 and K087 material, it's your opinion that the mixing of this material on the coal piles constituted land disposal?
- A. That's a fair representation, yes.
- Q. And you heard Miss Williams testify that for a number of reasons she believed that it didn't constitute land disposal, is that correct?
- A. I disagree with her. Yes.

- Q. And we are also in agreement, if I'm correct, that the regulations that talk about this process, both the solid waste definition and this -- the language of this exemption, neither of those specify that the recycling must occur on a specific pad or in a specific container or under specific conditions, is that a fair statement?
- A. That is correct. What the regulation does, it attempts to prevent releases to the environment, yes.
- Q. It says that there should not be intervening

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1
      land disposal, correct?
 2
          There should be no land disposal.
 3
      Q. From the time of generation until it is
 4
      recycled to the ovens, correct?
 5
          Correct.
 6
         And your interpretation of that limitation is
 7
      that this recycling process did not comply with
 8
      that restriction?
9
      A. Correct.
10
         And Miss Williams's view was that it did?
11
      A. Correct.
12
               MR. LINSIN: I have nothing further, your
13
      Honor.
              Thank you.
14
               THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Linsin. Thank you.
15
          Mr. Personius.
16
               MR. PERSONIUS: I have no questions,
17
      Judge.
18
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
19
               MR. MANGO: I have two, your Honor.
20
               THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mango.
21
               MR. MANGO:
                            Thank you.
22
               THE COURT: Sure.
23
     REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MANGO:
24
          Mr. Flax, in your position -- again
25
      incorporating your earlier testimony -- in your
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1 position as head of the RCRA program for Region 2 2 of EPA, would you in any realm of the possibility 3 authorize the paving over of the area around the 4 Barrett tanks and allow the building on top of 5 those areas after pavement is put down? In the condition in which I understood the area 6 7 was, in no way would I authorize that. 8 Okay. Are you aware of any type of guidance 9 letter authored by Miss Williams involving the 10 Toledo Coke Corporation, which determined --11 MR. LINSIN: Objection, your Honor. 12 MR. MANGO: Your Honor, if I can get the 13 whole question out --14 THE COURT: No. Let's hear it over here 15 first. (Side bar discussion held on the record.) 16 17 MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor. 18 Miss Williams has authored a quidance letter in 19 response to a question that came in from the Toledo 20 Coke Corporation, which says that K087 waste is --21 the coal tar sludge is used to produce a fuel. 22 That's directly relevant to the question that was 23 brought up on cross-examination. He's aware of 24 that, and I think it's fair to ask him. 25 questioned as to his knowledge of coke being a fuel and what is used to produce a fuel.

THE COURT: When was this letter, and what did it relate to? Was it an investigation? Was it a court proceeding?

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, it was a letter that came to EPA when Miss Williams was head of the Office of Solid Waste, and she responded by giving the opinion of what the Office of Solid Waste is.

THE COURT: When was that?

MR. MANGO: I believe, 1988.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, the opinion

letters -- and this is as to Miss Williams or

anybody else -- issued by EPA are in response to a

specific set of circumstances posed by a question.

They are fact specific. They are not viewed by the

agency as precedential. This is three or four

steps below a policy statement, and I think it is a

distortion and a misuse out of context of documents

that counsel knows are sui generis.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what the context is, which makes it problematic. I mean, this is a question that better should have been asked to Miss Williams rather than this witness. His knowledge of it, I think, tends to be more confusing, I mean, in the overall picture of

1 things. I'm going to deny the request to ask that 2 question. 3 MR. LINSIN: Thank you. 4 MR. MANGO: Yes, sir. 5 (End of side bar discussion.) THE COURT: Okay. Objection sustained. 6 7 BY MR. MANGO: 8 Q. Mr. Flax, you testified on cross that in all of 9 the regulatory opinions you've observed you believe 10 coke is a fuel? 11 A. That's correct. 12 MR. MANGO: All right. Thank you, your 13 Honor. Nothing else. MR. LINSIN: No further questions, your 14 15 Honor. Thank you. 16 MR. PERSONIUS: Nothing. Thank you, 17 Judge. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Flax, you are 19 excused. Thank you very much. 20 MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I would say 21 subject to any questions by the jury. 22 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I feel 23 terrible. All right. Are there any questions? 24 Chris, I think we're going to need your 25 assistance on this, please.

1 Okay. Thank you very much. This is a record 2 number of, at least, pieces of paper containing 3 questions. 4 Okay. Let's put you on a little white noise. 5 Let me work this through with the attorneys, and 6 then we'll go forward. 7 You want to take a break? We'll have you back 8 here in 15 minutes. 9 MR. LINSIN: Would it be possible to make 10 copies so we can read them? 11 THE COURT: Yes, absolutely. 12 (Jury excused from the courtroom.) 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Flax, you can 14 step down. 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Don't leave. 17 We'll have Mr. Flax outside while we discuss 18 and resolve. But I will make copies of the 19 questions for you. 20 MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: You're welcome. We'll see you 22 in a few minutes. 23 (Short recess was taken.) 24 (Jury not present in the courtroom.) 25 MR. LINSIN: My apologies, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, no, not at all.

All right. Let's try to work through a couple of questions. I think your staped accumulation starts with Juror number 6's question?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's

Miss Majerowski's question, actually. And the
question is: "According to RCRA, what would a

company have to do if they purchased a facility

with abandoned tanks from the previous owners on

their land after RCRA was in effect, if they didn't

actively manage these abandoned tanks?"

Fair question.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ LINSIN: No problem with that question, your Honor.

THE COURT: Interesting question.

MR. MANGO: It was.

THE COURT: You agree?

MR. MANGO: Yes. Fair question, your Honor. And the second part, "What would RCRA do then if the company did just that?" I would make sure that gets in there as well. But, yes, fair question.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. LINSIN: I don't know what the second

part means. That's my problem.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LINSIN: I don't know what the "did just that" means.

THE COURT: I'm not sure "what RCRA would do," either. I don't know what that means. What do you think that means?

MR. MANGO: I think it means if they didn't actively manage, that is, I believe, what she's referring to as "did just that," which would be did not actively manage, what would RCRA do. It's really just a -- trying to restate the question. So, actually, I'm comfortable if you want to leave that part out, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's -and I will. I'll delete that, because I don't
think I can interpret what that means, and I think
we run a risk if we ask her what that means. And I
think the first question is a good question.

Okay. The first question from Steven Bauman,

Juror number 7, is at the bottom of the page: Does
the 3.4 feet -- 3 to 4 feet I think it is -- of

COD.

MR. LINSIN: Coal. It looks like cod, but I think it's coal in the coalfield.

1 MR. PERSONIUS: Oh, yes. Coal in the 2 coalfield. 3 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. That's probably 4 regulated by the Clean Water Act. All right. 5 -- of coal in the coalfield make any difference 6 in regards to land disposal or have any effect on 7 runoff because of rain? 8 MR. MANGO: Fair question. 9 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Personius? 10 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, I agree, Judge. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And fair 12 question next, I think: "Has anyone actually 13 determined the depth of coal by means of a core 14 sample, et cetera?" 15 I'll permit that. 16 MR. MANGO: I don't think he'll know the 17 answer. 18 THE COURT: Anybody object to that 19 question? 20 MR. MANGO: No. 21 MR. LINSIN: No, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Now we go to Mr. Collins's 23 question, I think, which is Juror number 3: "Do 24 you know if the mixing of K087 is done on a pad or 25 back in the coalfields?"

1 MR. MANGO: It seems like a strange 2 question, because I think he testified that what 3 his understanding of the -- Count 19 of the 4 indictment would be, which is the mixing of the 5 K087 waste on the coal piles on the ground. 6 I'm comfortable with it being asked. I don't 7 think -- I really don't see the point of it, but --8 MR. LINSIN: I agree it is a -- it is 9 difficult to understand the point of it, and this 10 witness, especially in his rebuttal testimony, has 11 testified only about an operation that occurred on 12 the coal piles. 13 THE COURT: Well, the question -- yeah, 14 the more I think about it, do you know. I think 15 that's what he wants to know from this witness. Ιf 16 he knows. Right? 17 MR. MANGO: Yeah. Is that --18 MR. PERSONIUS: That could be. 19 MR. LINSIN: Okay. 20 THE COURT: I think that's okay. 21 MR. LINSIN: All right. 22 THE COURT: I think it's just background. 23 MR. PERSONIUS: Would it be appropriate, 24 your Honor, to change the "is" to a "was"?

Because, I mean, what's being done presently, I

mean, literally, what's being done now, it is being done on a pad. So maybe consider changing that to "was"?

THE COURT: Yeah, I think that's right. I think that --

MR. MANGO: Well, maybe that was the point of the question, actually. If we're having trouble interpreting the question, that could very well be what Mr. Collins is trying to get at is what is being done now.

THE COURT: Well, that's not relevant.

MR. LINSIN: That's right.

THE COURT: I'll ask it only as "was," and if it triggers some sort of reaction from him, then we'll hold it at that, and I'll explain to him that phrasing it in any other way would make it irrelevant.

All right. I think this is Mrs. Funderburk's question, number 5: "Under RCRA, in your opinion, would the runoff of tar sludge and coal from the coal piles into the ditches be considered as hazardous waste?"

MR. MANGO: That's a good question.

MR. LINSIN: No problem with this question, your Honor. With the intro under RCRA?

1 THE COURT: Yes. It will, yes. Under 2 RCRA. 3 MR. LINSIN: All right. Okay. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And Miss Russ's 5 question, number 10: "Coal is a raw material and 6 therefore is unregulated, but when the coal is 7 mixed with K087 or D018, is that mixture an 8 unregulated raw material? Why or why not?" 9 MR. LINSIN: Fair question, your Honor. 10 MR. PERSONIUS: I think that's a great 11 question. 12 MR. MANGO: Likewise. It's a good 13 question. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. PERSONIUS: Got the numbers down too, 16 Judge. That's scary. THE COURT: I know. I know. It's 17 18 amazing. Okay. All right. Everybody in 19 agreement? 20 MR. LINSIN: Yes. 21 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes. Thank you, Judge. 22 MR. MANGO: Yes. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Chris, would you ask 24 the jury if they want to come back out? 25 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Sure will.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, do you want to have Mr. Linsin ask these again or not?

THE COURT: No. Don't ask that question. Okay.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: You know, ladies and gentlemen, I don't know how you do it. I have fewer objections to your questions than when the attorneys ask questions. How can that be?

Have a seat, please.

Okay. And for not asking you about your questions, I get put in the penalty box all day tomorrow. All right. So, we will begin, and, you know, this is really serious business, and again on behalf of everybody we thank you for all the efforts that you're making to really be engaged in this process, because, you know, very shortly you're going to be in a position where we're going to ask you to return that unanimous verdict.

So each of your questions I am going to ask.

And thank you for those, and I ask everybody to pay close attention. And Mr. Flax remains under oath, and these questions will be directed to him in no particular order. They happened to leave the order

that I arranged them, and Miss Labuzzetta

photocopied them in another order, so we're going

to go with her order, and then I'll pay the price

later on for saying that.

But we're going start with Miss Majerowski's question, Mr. Flax. And remember you are under oath, and ask you to be as directly responsive as you can. Here's your first question:

According to RCRA, what would a company have to do if they purchased a facility with abandoned tanks from the previous owners on their land after RCRA was in effect, if they didn't, quote, actively manage, close quote, these abandoned tanks?

Question mark.

Do you understand the question?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: First let me say that management in tanks is storage and is always considered active management. It would be the responsibility of the new owners to determine what is in those tanks and to handle that material appropriately.

When tanks like these are, you know, on a property and the ownership of the tanks crosses the

dates of RCRA implementation, there is still a responsibility. Responsibility doesn't go away when a facility changes ownership. There are still those tanks, and the contents in those tanks needs to be addressed. And if it is regulated under RCRA, it has to be managed.

If tanks on a facility that are left there by a previous owner and they're there when a new owner takes possession of the property, if those tanks contained gold or diamonds, there would be no shortage of people taking responsibility for what's in those tanks.

THE COURT: So your answer is that under RCRA the new owners would have to determine what is in those tanks?

THE WITNESS: We would hope that as the facility changed ownership, your Honor, that there would be discussion between the previous owner and the new owner as to what the nature of the material is in the tanks, so it could be handled properly.

If that wasn't the case, then it's the responsibility of the new owner of the property to know whether or not they are storing hazardous waste in those tanks.

THE COURT: All right. Storing hazardous

wastes that are solids, and then they would have to actively manage, is that your testimony?

THE WITNESS: Storage -- storage, by definition, your Honor, is active management.

THE COURT: Okay. That's the answer to your question. Okay? Okay.

A JUROR: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Next question: Does the 3 to 4 square feet -- and I think, Mr. Bauman, this is your question -- of coal in coalfields make any difference in regards to land disposal or have any effect on runoff because of rain, question mark.

THE WITNESS: It may, because of its configuration on the ground, serve to channel the rain in a certain direction when it hits the coal. But it makes no differentiation in terms of disposal for RCRA, if there was coal on the ground, if RCRA-regulated waste is dumped right on top of that.

THE COURT: Okay. And that, again, coal is not a raw material?

THE WITNESS: It is a raw material, your $\mbox{\sc Honor.}$

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: When it's being used as a raw material.

THE COURT: It makes no difference?

THE WITNESS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. That's the answer to one of the questions. The second question is this: Has -- if you know, and for the relevant years in question, has anyone actually determined the depth of the coal, for example, by means of a core sample or the like?

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I did hear reference to, you know, between 3 and 6 feet of coal, but I've never seen anything where anyone went out and actually did borings to determine the actual thickness.

THE COURT: Okay. So you don't know?
THE WITNESS: No, I do not know.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Mrs. Funderburk, I think this is your question, and it relates to under RCRA: In your opinion,
Mr. Flax, would the runoff of tar sludge and coal from the coal piles into the ditches be considered hazardous waste?

THE WITNESS: The runoff of the tar sludge would be considered hazardous waste. The runoff

from the coal, no. That's a raw ingredient.

THE COURT: Okay. Next question,

Mr. Collins, I believe: Do you know if the mixing

of K087 was done on a pad or back in the

coalfields?

THE WITNESS: The indications I have from the inspection reports that I've read from my own staff indicates that they were told that the mixing of the tar sludge was done in the coalfields and not on the pad. I also had some indications that there were times when they infrequently did use the pad, but that most of the time it was done in the coalfields on the ground.

A JUROR: I meant today, like now.

THE COURT: Okay. What I'm going to do is I'm going to let the question that I asked, anticipating that it was your question, stand. The question that you want answered is not relevant, so I'm not going to be able to answer that, and it's not a consideration for you as of today. Okay?

A JUROR: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. And then,
Miss Russ, we're going to ask your question: Coal
is a raw material and therefore is unregulated, but
when the coal is mixed with the KO87 or DO18 --

THE WITNESS: That's a very good question.

The coal is an unregulated raw material. The tar sludge is a regulated material. The mixture of the coal tar sludge with the coal does not make the whole mixture a regulated material, but the tar

18 -- is that mixture an unregulated raw material?

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this. The question goes on to say then: Why or why not?

sludge remains a regulated material.

THE WITNESS: Because mixtures of raw ingredients and hazardous waste do not make the whole mixture a hazardous waste.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, Mr. Mango?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. I have a

brief follow-up, if I could, to the first question
in light of the answer. Do you want me to stand
here or sit here?

THE COURT: No, you can come to the podium, and then I will open it up to the other attorneys to follow up if they choose to do that.

But, again, ladies and gentlemen, those questions and the responses I -- obviously, they're good questions. I hope the responses have been of assistance to you. But the procedure is that we

will now allow the attorneys to follow up, and then we will bring Mr. Flax's testimony to a closure.

Okay.

All right, Mr. Mango, please.

MR. MANGO: Thank you very much, your Honor.

Mr. Flax, I'd like to just go back to the first question you were asked, where you talked about storage of material in abandoned tanks. And you constitute that as storage in tanks is by definition active management, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

MR. MANGO: Now, can you contrast that to storage of material that is just on the ground?

THE WITNESS: Well, storage -- material that is stored on the grounds -- are you talking about pre-RCRA implementation or post-RCRA implementation?

MR. MANGO: Pre and then post, if you can tell the jury.

THE WITNESS: All right. Well, previous to the implementation date of RCRA in November 1980, material on the ground was not regulated. Material that had previously been disposed, abandoned on the ground, was not regulated. And

the agency made a decision not to regulate that material, when RCRA was implemented, unless it became actively managed. The idea was, it's there, don't mess around with it. If you're going to manage it, then we want you to do it under a RCRA permit so that can be done under the right conditions and -- and sufficient agency oversight of your management of that material can be given.

So if it was not actively managed after RCRA was implemented, leave it alone. If you're going to actively manage it, we want to be able to see what you're doing. So if you did that after RCRA was implemented, you needed a RCRA permit so that we would have that oversight and it would be done properly.

MR. MANGO: Thank you. And then the question related to materials that remained in tanks, that's different, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Tanks are storage, and storage by definition is active management.

MR. MANGO: Okay. Thank you. That was my only follow-up, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mango. Thank you.
Mr. Linsin?

MR. LINSIN: I have nothing further.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Personius?

witness?

MR. PERSONIUS: No questions, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Flax, you're excused. Thank you very much.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that the last government

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. The government rests.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay, ladies and gentlemen, both sides have now rested. And now we have to work out the details of getting you the instructions, settling the exhibits, getting all of that finalized. Are you holding up okay today?

Okay.

And then there will be, obviously, closing arguments. And remember what I've said, that all these discussions that I have with you and the discussions with the lawyers, none of that is evidence.

The closing arguments will not be evidence, but it will be, I believe, very different from the opening statements that you have heard, because now

you have heard all of the evidence. You know more about this case than anybody walking the face of the earth. And the lawyers now put on a different hat, so to speak, and they will in their arguments try to persuade you, from the evidence, as to whether or not there's enough to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt as to satisfying the government's burden in this case or not.

And, obviously, if the government doesn't satisfy its burden on any of the counts, you must acquit; and, likewise, convict if the government has convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt. So that means that you have to apply the law as I give it to you without questioning the wisdom of the law. And I'll give you a couple of definitions that you've heard about in terms of active management in, terms of -- what's the other?

MR. MANGO: Land disposal.

THE COURT: Yeah, land disposal. Both of those I will give you, plus a lot of definitions, a lot of information. So, that's all to come.

What I'm going to ask you to do, and I know we're shuttling you in and out, and you know you're not coming back in the morning, so we'll see you tomorrow at noon, but I need to work out a couple

of things with the attorneys right now, and I'll have you back in here in, hopefully, 15 or so minutes, and then I'll let you know what is left in store for today. Okay?

All right. Thank you very much. We'll see you in about 15 or so.

(Jury excused from the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. Please have a seat.

All right. I'd like to find out -- I know,

Mr. Personius, you had mentioned that with respect

to the first 38 charges -- and obviously some of

these perhaps need to be excluded, but I'll take

the comments of the attorneys. What I'll do is

I'll go this way. Charge number 1, any comment.

Otherwise, if I hear none, I'll move to 2 and

charge 1 will be accepted. Does that work for

everybody?

MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Charge 1, juror attentiveness. Hearing nothing, charge number 2 -- and hearing nothing, it's accepted.

Charge number 2, role of the Court. Hearing nothing, accepted.

Charge number 3, role of the Court. Hearing nothing, accepted.

1 Charge number 4, juror obligations. Hearing 2 nothing, accepted. 3 Charge number 5, the government as a party. 4 Hearing nothing, accepted. 5 Charge number 6, conduct of counsel. Hearing 6 nothing, accepted. 7 Charge number 7, common counsel and counsel 8 cooperation. Hearing nothing, accepted. 9 Charge number 8, jury to consider only these 10 defendants. Hearing nothing, accepted. 11 Charge number 9, consider each defendant 12 separately. Hearing nothing, accepted. 13 Charge number 10, multiple counts, multiple 14 defendants. Hearing nothing, accepted. 15 Charge number 11, improper considerations, 16 race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. 17 Hearing nothing, accepted. Charge number 12, sympathy. Hearing nothing, 18 19 accepted. 20 Charge number 13, punishment. Hearing nothing, 21 accepted. 22 Charge number 14, testimony and exhibits in 23 general. Hearing nothing, accepted. 24 Charge number 15, stipulations of fact. 25 Hearing nothing, accepted.

Charge number 16, judicial notice.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, it was just one.

I don't believe, based on our recollection, the

Court has taken judicial notice of any facts, so we

don't see this as necessary.

THE COURT: I can take judicial notice of the fact that we didn't take judicial notice in this case, if that works, just so we keep it in here. No. Okay. No, I agree. And I think charge number 16 -- I will leave it so we don't throw all the numbers off. It will be intentionally left blank. When I give everything to the jury, charge number 16 -- I don't want to renumber everything. It gets really cumbersome. It will be intentionally left blank, okay?

MR. LINSIN: All right.

THE COURT: Charge number 17, charts and summaries.

MR. MANGO: I think everything has been admitted at this point.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MANGO: Charts and summaries.

THE COURT: Accepted, having heard

nothing. Okay.

Charge number 18. Yes?

LAW CLERK: Can we go back to 17? 1 2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 LAW CLERK: So do you want to -- if you 4 did instruct the jury, you gave them the other 5 charge on charts admitted. This one is not 6 admitted as evidence. So are we going to 7 substitute the charge you already gave, were there 8 some of each, or --9 MR. MANGO: That's why I noted it, because 10 it says in parentheses not admitted as evidence, 11 and I think all the charts have been admitted so --12 LAW CLERK: Should substitute the other 13 charge for this one in the same spot. 14 MR. MANGO: I think that would be 15 appropriate. 16 MR. LINSIN: Which other charge are you 17 referring to? 18 LAW CLERK: It's not one in the materials. 19 It's the one the Judge gave at the time the chart 20 came in. You gave a different charge that's not 21 in --22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. LINSIN: We would agree with the 24 substance of what's -- we would agree with counsel

for the government that that would be appropriate.

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1 LAW CLERK: It was a standard charge. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Okay. 3 Question -- charge number 18, questions. 4 Hearing nothing, admitted. 5 Charge 19, direct and circumstantial evidence. 6 Hearing nothing, admitted. 7 Okay. Charge number 20, similar acts. Hearing 8 nothing, admitted. 9 Charge number 21, inference defined. Hearing 10 nothing, admitted. 11 Charge number 22, impermissible to infer 12 participation from mere presence. 13 MR. LINSIN: I defer to Mr. Personius on 14 that, your Honor. To me it doesn't seem relevant 15 to the facts in this case, but I would defer to 16 Mr. Personius. 17 MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, are we on 22 18 or 23, please? 19 THE COURT: 22. My own view is it should 20 go in. 21 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, I think it should. 22 THE COURT: And likewise with 23. 23 MR. LINSIN: All right. Fine. No 24 objection, your Honor, certainly. 25 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Both will be given. 2 Number of witnesses and uncontradicted 3 testimony, number 24. Hearing nothing, admitted. 4 25, witness credibility generally. Hearing 5 nothing, admitted. 6 Charge number 26, admission of defendant. 7 Hearing nothing, admitted. 8 Charge number 27, law enforcement witness. 9 Hearing nothing, admitted. 10 28, informal immunity of government witness. 11 MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I thought this 12 would be an issue. There were a number of 13 witnesses who did have informal immunity, but it 14 was not questioned on cross, we didn't bring it out 15 on direct, and I don't think we need this charge. 16 THE COURT: All right. I've got a 17 question mark next to my copy, so I don't know what 18 defense counsel feel. 19 MR. LINSIN: We don't have a recollection, 20 your Honor, of this being raised with any witness. 21 THE COURT: No, I don't believe it was. 22 MR. PERSONIUS: I don't think it was, 23 Judge. I think Mr. Mango's right. 24 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then 25 this will similarly be designated as intentionally

left blank. 1 2 Okay. 29, impeachment by prior inconsistent 3 statement. Hearing nothing, accepted. 4 Charge number 30, interest in the outcome. 5 Hearing nothing, accepted. 6 31, bias and hostility. Hearing nothing, 7 accepted. 8 Charge number 32, presumption of innocence and 9 burden of proof. Hearing nothing, accepted. 10 Reasonable doubt, that's charge 33. Hearing 11 nothing, accepted. 12 Charge number 34A, improper consideration of 13 defendant's right not to testify. That, I think, 14 would apply only to your client, I think, 15 Mr. Personius. 16 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes. We would like that 17 charge. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Hearing nothing in 19 opposition, accepted. 20 34B intentionally left blank? 21 MR. PERSONIUS: Yes. 22 MR. LINSIN: Yes, that's acceptable, your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Charge number 35,

specific investigative techniques not required.

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1 MR. PERSONIUS: I had a question, Judge, 2 on whether that -- I don't see how that was raised 3 as an issue. I don't see this charge as applying. 4 MR. MANGO: I agree, your Honor. 5 MR. LINSIN: I agree as well, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. I mean, that's kind of 7 an odd charge anyway, I mean, generally speaking, 8 because it's confusing, but --9 MR. PERSONIUS: That's why the defense 10 sometimes like it, Judge, but I don't think it 11 applies here. 12 THE COURT: I know, because it does come up in certain types of cases, but I think it's a 13 14 little difficult in this one, so I will --15 MR. LINSIN: Maybe core samples, your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: It's a valiant effort, I 18 think, but -- okay. You know, it will probably be 19 one of the issues with the jury, right? Okay. 20 Charge number 35 will be intentionally left blank. 21 36, corporate responsibility. 22 MR. LINSIN: No objection. 23 THE COURT: Hearing nothing, accepted. 24 Responsible corporate officer. Hearing 25 nothing, accepted.

1 And indictment is not evidence. Hearing 2 nothing, accepted. 3 And then we'll stop there. Okay? 4 All right. I'd like to maybe take another ten 5 minutes, and then I'd like to start this portion of 6 the charge, complete it, let the jury go. I mean, 7 this is probably just short of an hour, probably. 8 And let them go for the day, and then we start 9 tomorrow roughly at 12:00 o'clock or so. MR. LINSIN: And what is the Court's 10 11 pleasure with regard to discussion then on -- our 12 discussion regarding the substantive charges? 13 If --14 THE COURT: We'll do that tomorrow 15 morning. We'll have a charge conference. MR. LINSIN: All right. 16 17 THE COURT: Does that work for everybody? 18 MR. MANGO: Absolutely. 19 THE COURT: And we'll -- 9:30? What do we 20 have calendarwise, please? 21 Mary will be leaving us for a few days. 22 It's rehab, but I wasn't supposed to say. 23 MR. PERSONIUS: She has asked that the 24 fireman who was at Tonawanda Coke tape the

summations so she can watch them, Judge.

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1 THE COURT: All right. How about 2 10:00 o'clock tomorrow? 3 MR. MANGO: That would be great. 4 THE COURT: All right. And then, you 5 know, we'll take a look at what your positions are. 6 We should be able to get everything resolved by 7 noonish. Actually, you probably want to move it as 8 quickly as we can so you can kind of rest up for 9 summations. 10 MR. LINSIN: Well, some of the 11 arguments -- it would be helpful to have some 12 period of time between the resolution and perhaps 13 the need to adjust some of how we've addressed this 14 in the closing, in the summation. 15 THE COURT: Yeah. Why don't we do this. 16 Why don't we make it 9:30. I'll try to move the 17 calendar as quickly as I can. That might give us a 18 little bit of extra time. 19 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's take 21 ten or so, and then we'll be back out, Chris, and 22 we'll get started. Okay? 23 (Short recess was taken.) 24 THE COURT: Are we all set? 25 MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Chris, if you'd bring the jury in, please.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Everybody doing okay? Welcome back. Please have a seat.

Thank you, Chris.

COURT SECURITY OFFICER: You're welcome, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, here's what is in store for you for this afternoon. And, as you know, my job, kind of as the referee, draws to a close, and then I give you what is the charge or the instruction in the law, and then you are to apply that law without questioning the wisdom of the law. You've heard me say that before.

You've heard me say a lot of things, and it's been repetition by design, so that when I get to giving you the full instruction, most of the terms you will have been familiar with, you would have heard, and they will come together a little bit easier.

The one thing I want to stress is this. I'm going to only give you a part of it this afternoon, all right, and it's the preliminary part. But keep

this in mind, and, you know, if you think about it, because you're going to be asked to apply your common sense, your experience, and your intelligence to everything that you do from this point forward. And you've got a lot of listening to do, all right, and you should listen intently. I mean, you've been terrific with all the complexities and everything in this particular case. And now you're going to be hearing from the attorneys starting tomorrow afternoon.

What I'd like to do is give you a part of what we call the charge or the instruction. But using your common sense, just keep in mind that the total charge that I give you is the instruction in the law. No one part is separate and more important from the totality of the charge. There's one law, one instruction in the law, that applies. And it's everything that I'm going to be telling you.

It makes sense to me, anyway, to break it down, to give you this preliminary portion of the charge, and we'll address some of the terms that you've been hearing about in terms of burden of proof and definitions of certain terms. We'll get to all of that and how you proceed, and credibility and the like. So I'll give you that first, and then we're

going to take a break for the afternoon, and you'll come back tomorrow at noon, you'll hear the attorneys argue, and then there is the remaining part of the instruction that I still will have to give you before you start your deliberations.

And if there is anything that -- when the arguments come, that appears different from what I tell you today or what I will give you by -- in the charge portion that follows the closing arguments, your instruction will be to rely on what I say, not what the attorneys say. But you can use, certainly, their argument to guide you in coming to a resolve on the critical issues in this case, because you have to decide those fact issues. That's why you're here. You're the judges of the facts.

So, I am going to start. I'll work through this. I'll try to be as deliberate as possible so that you get an understanding of at least the start of this charge, and then we'll work through another time the breakdown of the different counts of the indictments and the elements. We started with some of that, if you remember, at the very beginning of the case, trying to get you to focus and think in terms of elements which the government has to

prove, because they're essential, beyond a
reasonable doubt.

So, you get these instructions before you actually enter into your final duty, which is to decide the fact issues in this case. Please pay as close attention to me now as you have throughout the course of the trial. That's because, you know, frankly, it's not a personal thing with me, but this case is very important to both sides. And the only way that you can satisfy your duty in the manner in which you have taken the oath to do in this case is to pay strict and close attention to what I say, what the attorneys will argue to you, and to apply the law as I give it to you.

I did mention to you at the very start of the trial that your principle function during the taking of testimony would be to listen carefully and observe each witness who testified, and I've told you this many times. It's been very obvious to me and, I know, to the attorneys as well, that you have faithfully discharged that duty, and you did follow the testimony — and that's evidenced by the questions you've asked — with the closest of attention. So I will proceed and just simply ask you to give me your careful attention with this

instruction.

You have heard all of the evidence in the case, and you are about to hear the closing arguments of the lawyers for the parties, and you know that's the United States, Tonawanda Coke Corporation, and Mark Kamholz. My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. It's your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine them, and just as it has been my duty to preside over the trial and decide what testimony and evidence is relevant under the law for your consideration.

On the legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you, and if an attorney says something -- and we just talked about this -- and states a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow.

And you should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law, but you should consider my instruction as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room. It's like when you're working on a project. The end result of everything you do is the completed item, project, something that, you know, you may have constructed. That's

the end. That's the totality. And that's the same with this charge that I'm in the process of giving you.

Again, don't be concerned about the wisdom of the rule of law that I state, because regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the law may be or ought to be, it would in point of fact violate your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I'm going to give you starting now.

Your final rule -- role is to pass upon and decide the fact issues. We've talked about that many times. You, the members of the jury, are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the weight of the evidence, you determine the credibility, the believability of the witnesses, and you resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony, and you draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them.

And I will soon give you instructions upon how to pass upon the credibility, and that's the same thing as we talk about when we say the believability of the witnesses.

In determining the facts, you must rely upon

your own recollection of the evidence. What the lawyers have said in their opening statements, what they will say in their closing arguments, what has been discussed in the objections or in their questions, is not evidence.

In this connection, you should bear in mind that a question put to a witness is never evidence. It is only the answer which is evidence. Nor is there anything I may have said during the trial or may say during these instructions or the arguments with respect to a fact matter to be taken -- is to be taken in substitution for your own independent recollection. Simply, common sense, experience, intelligence. What I say is not evidence. That's how this works.

The evidence in this case before you consists of the answers given by the witnesses to the questions -- but the questions aren't evidence -- the testimony of those witnesses as they gave it, as you recall it, remember, respecting each other's input, judgment, and the exhibits that now have been received into evidence. And you will get all of those.

The evidence does not include questions. Only the answers are evidence. But you may not consider

any answer that I directed you to disregard or that I directed struck from the record. Do not consider those questions; do not consider those answers.

That happened just a few times in this case.

You may also consider stipulations, and there were a fair number of those, and it related in large measure to the exhibits that were received into evidence. And you'll notice that when you get the list of exhibits and the exhibits themselves. But remember I told you that in those instances where witnesses are referenced, you are supposed to view that as the testimony of a witness as if he or she appeared here in court.

Since you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts, I do not mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or what your verdict should be, personally. That's your duty. The rulings I have made during the trial are not any indication of my views of what your decision should be as to whether or not the guilt of the defendants, individually considered, has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Only you can decide that.

I also ask you to draw no inference from the fact that upon occasion I asked questions of certain witnesses. These questions, not as good as

yours most of the time, but were only intended for clarification or to expedite matters, and certainly were not intended to suggest any opinions on my part as to the verdict you should render or whether any of the witnesses may have been more credible than any other witness.

You are expressly to understand that the court, meaning me, has no opinion as to the verdict you should render in this case. As to the facts -- I bet you've heard this a few times, right? -- you are the exclusive judges. You are to perform the duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice as to any party. Be fair to both sides.

In determining the facts, you are reminded that before each member, each of you, was accepted and sworn to act as a juror, you were asked questions concerning competency, qualifications, fairness, and freedom from prejudice and bias. And it was on the faith of those answers that each of you was accepted to be jurors by the parties. Therefore, those answers that you gave are as binding on each of you now as they were then when you were first accepted and should remain so until you are discharged from consideration in this case.

You are to perform your duty of finding the

facts, importantly, without bias or prejudice to any of the paries. You are to perform your final duty in an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality. The case is important to the government -- we've stressed that before -- for the enforcement of criminal laws is a matter of prime concern to the community. And equally it is important to the defendants -- we've stressed this before -- because they're charged with serious crimes.

The fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States of America entitles the government to no greater consideration than that accorded to any other party to a litigation. By the same token, it is entitled to no less consideration. We're talking about fairness here. All parties, whether government or individuals, stand as equals at the bar of justice.

It is also the duty of the attorney for each side in the case to object when the other side offers testimony. We've talked about that from the beginning. And when there's evidence that's being offered, the same duty applies to the attorney, and that should be where the attorney believes that what's being offered is not properly admissible.

The attorneys also have the right and duty to ask me to make rulings of law and to request conferences. We've had a few sidebars, as you know, out of -- out of your hearing, technically. And usually that's so that I can decide the questions of law that are discussed. And my instruction is that you should not show any prejudice against any attorney or his client because the attorney objected to the admissibility of evidence, or asked for a conference out of your hearing, or asked me for a ruling of the law.

As I've already indicated, my rulings on the admissibility of evidence do not indicate any opinion about the weight or effect of the evidence. You are the sole judges of the believability of all witnesses and the weight and the effect of all of the evidence.

You have noticed, I'm sure -- and, you know, we had weekly introductions to the attorneys and whom they represent -- that the two defendants, the corporation and Mark Kamholz, are represented by separate attorneys, and the separate attorneys have consulted from time to time with each other and to some extent have divided the work of the trial in an effort, really, to facilitate their presentation

and to avoid duplication.

The fact that defense counsel have consulted and cooperated with each other in the conduct of their defense is not to be considered by you as having any significance with respect to the issues in this case. The issue of each defendant's guilt is personal, and you must take -- or make a separate determination as to whether or not each defendant's guilt has been proven -- what? -- beyond a reasonable doubt.

In making that judgment, you are to disregard entirely the circumstance that the attorneys for the defendants have worked together during the trial. Indeed, especially in a case of this length, it would be unusual and wasteful of time and effort if the attorneys did not get together, share the burdens of the defense, et cetera.

Now, you are about to be asked to decide whether or not the government in this case has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of each defendant. You are not being asked whether any other person has been proven guilty. Your verdict should be based solely upon the evidence or -- what? -- the lack of evidence, as to each defendant in accordance with my instructions and without

regard to whether the guilt of other people has or has not been proven.

The indictment names two defendants who are at trial together, and in reaching a verdict you must bear in mind that the guilt determination is individual. Your verdict as to each defendant must be determined separately with respect to each defendant solely on the evidence or lack of evidence presented against each defendant without regard to the guilt or innocence of anyone else.

In addition, some of the evidence in this case was limited to one defendant, Tonawanda Coke, for example. Let me emphasize that any evidence admitted solely against one defendant may be considered only against that defendant and may not in any respect enter into your deliberations on any other defendant. Thus, you must not consider any evidence that I limited to Tonawanda Coke, for example, in any way in your deliberations with respect to defendant Mark Kamholz. They must each be considered individually and separately.

You know the indictment, by now, contains 19 counts, right? And each count charges the defendants with a different separate crime. There are two defendants on trial before you. You must,

as a matter of law, consider each count of the indictment and each defendant's involvement in that count separately, and you must return a separate verdict on each defendant for each count in which they are charged. And you'll get a verdict form that will itemize for you each defendant on each count.

In reaching your verdict, bear in mind that guilt is personal and individual. Your verdict of guilty or not guilty must be based solely upon the evidence about each defendant. The case against each defendant on each count stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof against that defendant alone, and your verdict as to any defendant on any count should not control your decision as to any other defendant or any other count. No other considerations are proper.

Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence developed at trial or the lack of evidence, and it would be improper for you to consider in reaching your decision as to whether the government sustained its burden of proof -- because that is what you have to determine -- whether any personal feelings you may have about the defendant's race, religion, national origin,

sex, or age influence you. All persons are entitled to the presumption of innocence, and the government has the burden of proof, as I will discuss in a moment.

It would be equally improper for you to allow any feelings you might have about the nature of the crime charged to interfere with your decision-making process. And in part that's why we told you stay away from things outside the courtroom. To repeat: Your verdict must be based exclusively upon the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case.

You've also heard this, and, you know, every juror in every case throughout the country in the federal courts are going to hear these same charges, these same instructions, and that's what makes the system fair, and that's why we try to get it ingrained in you as we go through this process.

So under your oath as jurors you're not to be swayed by sympathy. You are to be guided solely by the evidence in this case, and the crucial, hard-core question that you must ask yourselves as you sift through the evidence is this: Common sense, experience, intelligence. Has the government proved its case, that is, the guilt of

the defendants, beyond a reasonable doubt?

It is for you alone to decide whether the government has proven that the defendants are guilty of the crimes charged solely on the basis of the evidence and subject to the law as I charge you. It must be clear to you that once you let fear or prejudice or bias or sympathy interfere with your thinking, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a true and just verdict. And you know what's at stake for the defendants.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to either of the defendants' guilt, you should not hesitate for any reason to find a verdict of acquittal for that defendant. Not guilty. But on the other hand, if you should find that the government has met its burden of proving either or both of the defendants' guilt -- what? -- beyond a reasonable doubt, you should not hesitate because of sympathy or any other reason to render a verdict of guilty. Fundamental fairness.

The question of possible punishment of the defendants should be and is of no concern to you and should not in any sense enter into or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing a

sentence, if there happens to be a conviction, rests exclusively on me, because I presided over this trial. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and to determine whether or not the defendants are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt solely upon the basis of such evidence. Under your oaths of jurors — or as jurors, you cannot allow a consideration of the punishment which may be imposed upon the defendants if they are convicted to influence your verdict in any way or in any sense enter into your deliberations.

Now, shortly I will explain to you the elements of the crimes. I won't do that today. But I want to discuss with you upon -- or the basis upon which your verdict must rest. In summary -- you've heard me mention this countless times -- it must be based, your verdict, upon the evidence introduced in this case.

The evidence in this case consists of what?

The sworn testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence and any stipulations that have been received into evidence. In this case there is no such thing as judicially noticed. I haven't done that in this case. And that's when I tell you what the evidence is. Here we've had

stipulations.

Exhibits which have been marked for identification but not received may not be considered by you as evidence. Only those exhibits received may be considered as evidence. You'll get an exhibit list, and it will contain only those exhibits that have been received into evidence, and you'll get the exhibits themselves. There may be testimony about exhibits that weren't received into evidence. You can consider that testimony, but you will not get the exhibits, because they haven't been admitted as competent evidence.

And, similarly, you are to disregard any testimony when I have ordered it to be stricken. I did that just a few times in this case. And as I indicated to you before, only the witnesses' answers are evidence, and you are not to consider a question as evidence. Similarly, statements made by counsel are not evidence.

You should consider the evidence in light of your own common sense and intelligence and experience, and you may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Anything you may have seen or heard about this case outside the courthouse is not evidence and

must be entirely disregarded.

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If you remember, a stipulation, that's an agreement among the attorneys and the parties — the corporation and the defendant — that a certain fact is true. And when you get a stipulation, you should regard the agreed fact as established as true, and you may choose to give it whatever consideration you feel is appropriate.

The government has presented exhibits in the form of charts and summaries, and so has the defendant, and I decided that those charts and summaries will be admitted, and they represent an effort to save time and avoid unnecessary inconvenience and give you guidance with respect to certain opinions that were rendered by the witnesses; or they reference, you know, large quantities of documents and discs and the like that have been introduced to you at trial, and try to make it more understandable and make it more workable for you to consider without having to expend an inordinate amount of time doing that. And you should consider those charts and summaries and the testimony and the underlying documents, to the extent that they have been provided to you, you would any other evidence in this case.

Again, let me emphasize that a lawyer's question is not evidence. At times a lawyer on cross-examination may have incorporated into a question a statement which assumed certain facts to be true and asked the witness if the statement was true. If the witness denies the truth of the statement and there is no evidence in the record proving that the assumed fact is true, then you may not consider the fact to be true simply because it was contained in the lawyer's questions. And lawyers on both sides sometimes do that. And not intentionally, but you have to apply that rule and just consider the answers of the witnesses as the evidence.

And, you know, one of the examples that we give sometimes, and I really don't like this example, but sometimes a lawyer, by way of example, will ask the question of a married witness, "When did you stop beating your spouse?" Well, you would not be permitted to consider as true the assumed fact that the witness ever beat his or her spouse unless the witness indicated he or she had or unless there is some other evidence in the record that he or she had beaten the spouse. And that's why the questions are not the evidence but the answers are.

There are two types of evidence which you may properly use in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not. One type is called direct evidence. Direct evidence is where a witness testifies as to what he or she saw, heard, or observed. In other words, when a witness testifies about what is known to him or her of his or her own knowledge by virtue of that witness's own senses, what he or she sees, feels, touches or hears, that's what? Direct evidence, right? I mean, that's common sense.

Circumstantial evidence, a little bit different. It's what tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts. And there's a simple example. I think we talked about it when we were going through jury selection that we use to demonstrate this. And that's when, for example, you entered the courthouse in the morning, the sun was shining, it was a nice day, and then, you know, after the course of the day and you can't really see outside, somebody comes in walking in with an umbrella dripping wet or snow particles, individuals came in with raincoats, overcoats, and the like, you know that even though you can't look outside the courtroom and you can't see whether weather conditions had changed, rain or snow, you

have no direct evidence of what's going on outside, but on the combination of facts which I have just asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been either raining or snowing.

I mean, that's the logical way of handling circumstantial evidence. But it is the equal of direct evidence. That's all there is. That's circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from an established fact the existence or the nonexistence of some other fact.

Circumstantial evidence has no less value than direct evidence, for it is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that before convicting a defendant the jury must be satisfied of the defendant's guilt -- what? -- beyond a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence in the case.

Now, the government in this case has offered certain evidence tending to show that on a different occasion the defendants engaged in conduct similar to the charges in the indictment. In that connection, let me remind you this way,

that the defendants are not on trial for committing any acts not alleged in the indictment. Okay. And that's why sometimes questions are not relevant, because they pertain to a period of time outside of the indictment, just by way of example.

So you may not consider the evidence of the similar act as a substitute for proof that the defendants committed the crimes charged, nor may you consider this evidence as proof that the defendants have a criminal personality or bad character.

The evidence of other similar acts was admitted for a much more limited purpose, and you may consider it only for that limited purpose. If you determine that the defendants committed the acts charged in the indictment and the similar acts as well, then you may, but you need not, draw an inference that in doing the acts charged in the indictment the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally and not because of some mistake, accident, or other innocent reasons.

Evidence of similar acts may not be considered by you for any other purpose. Specifically, you may not use the evidence to conclude that because the defendants committed the other acts they must

also have committed the acts charged in the indictment. You decide the acts charged in the indictment, the crimes that are charged in the indictment.

So let's talk a little bit about inference and that term, because it's been mentioned to you, and we talk about it in the context of reasonable inferences. And you'll probably hear the attorneys ask you or at least comment that — tomorrow in their closing arguments, that you may reasonably infer such and such. And when you are asked that, you will be asked to infer on the basis of your reason, experience, and common sense, from one or more established facts, the existence of some other fact. Not complicated. Just draw a reasonable inference.

That's what inference is. But what is it not?

Okay. An inference is not a suspicion or a guess.

It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists on the basis of another fact which you know exists.

Now, if you think about that, there may be times when a different inference may be drawn from a set of facts, whether proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. The government may ask

you to draw one set of inferences, while the defense may ask you to draw another.

It is for you and you alone to decide what inferences you will draw. That's your job, because that involves being the judges of the facts. The process of drawing inferences from facts in evidence, again, is not a matter of guesswork or speculation. You've got to work at it. You've got to know what that reasonable inference is.

An inference is a deduction or a conclusion, which you, the jury, are permitted to draw, but you're not required to draw it, from the facts which have been established by either -- what kind of evidence, because there's two kinds, right? -- direct or circumstantial. And in drawing the inferences, you should exercise your common sense. That's, you know -- and you can do it. You draw the reasonable inferences.

So while you are considering the evidence presented to you, you are permitted to draw from the facts which you find to be proven such reasonable inferences as would be justified in the light of your everyday experience. I mean, you represent the cross-section of our community.

Here again, let me remind you that whether

based upon direct or circumstantial evidence or upon -- what? -- the logical, reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence, you must be satisfied of the guilt of a defendant, should you so find, beyond a reasonable doubt, before you may convict.

Keep this in mind, too, that you may not infer that the defendant is guilty of participating in criminal conduct merely from the fact that he was present at the time of the crime or at the time the crime was being committed and had knowledge that it was being committed. That mere presence is not enough.

And you may not infer that the defendant was guilty of participating in criminal conduct merely from the fact that he associated with other people who were guilty of wrongdoing.

And remember we talked about the number of witnesses, too. What do -- we have 30 witnesses that have testified. And the government called more witnesses than the defense, and, you know, it's -- whoever introduces more evidence than the other doesn't mean that you should necessarily find the facts in the favor of the side offering the most witnesses or the most evidence. By the same token, you do not have to accept the testimony of

any witness who has not been contradicted or impeached if you find the witness not to be -- what? -- credible. The witness has to be believable or credible.

You also have to decide which witnesses to believe and which facts are true. To do this, you must look at all the evidence, drawing upon your common sense, your experience, your intelligence. And after examining all the evidence, you may decide that the party calling the most witnesses has not persuaded you, because you do not believe its witnesses or because you do believe the fewer witnesses called by the other side.

Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that the burden of proof is where? It's always on the government, and the defendants are not required to call upon any witnesses or offer any evidence since they are -- what? -- presumed innocent.

Now, you have had an opportunity to observe all of the witnesses, and your job is to decide what weight, if any, to give to their testimony, who's believable, to what extent. In other words, how believable was the witness who was called, in your minds. You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of the

testimony that you've received from those witnesses.

Now, it's probably clear to you by now that you are being called upon to resolve the various factual issues under the indictment. And you'll, I'm sure, have those identified with specificity tomorrow. And you're going to hear very different pictures painted by the attorneys in this case, which probably can't be reconciled. And you're going to have to decide where the truth lies.

And an important part of that decision will involve making judgments about the testimony of the witnesses that you have listened to and observed.

And in making those judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and any other matter in evidence which may help you to decide the truth and the importance of each witness's testimony.

Your decision whether or not to believe a witness may depend on how that witness impressed you. For example, was the witness candid, frank, and forthright, or did the witness seem as if he or she was hiding something, being evasive, or suspect in some way? How did the witness testify on direct

examination compared with how the witness testified on cross-examination? Was the witness consistent in his or her testimony, or did he or she contradict himself or herself? Did the witness appear to know what he or she was talking about, and did the witness strike you as one who was trying to report his or her knowledge accurately?

How much each of you concludes to believe a witness may be influenced by the witness's bias.

Does the witness have a relationship with the government or a defendant which may affect how she or he testified? Does the witness have some incentive, loyalty, or motive that may cause him or her to shade the truth? Or does the witness have some bias, prejudice, or hostility that may have caused the witness, consciously or not, to give you something other than a completely accurate account of the witness's -- of the facts he or she testified to?

Now, even if the witness was impartial, you should consider whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the facts he or she testified about. You know, a lot of these go back a number of years. And you should also consider the witness's ability to express himself or

herself, and I think it's obvious some witnesses do a better job than others. Ask yourselves whether the witness's recollection of the facts stands up in light of all of the other evidence.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size a person up in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and in light of all the other evidence in the case, just as you would in any important matter where you are trying to decide if a person is truthful, straightforward, and accurate in his or her recollection. In deciding the question of credibility, remember that you should use your common sense, your experience, your judgment, your intelligence.

There has been evidence in this case that the defendant Mark Kamholz made certain statements in which the government claims he admitted certain facts charged in the indictment. In deciding what weight to give to the defendant's statements, you should first examine with great care whether each statement was made and whether, in fact, it was voluntarily and understandingly made. I instruct you that you are to give the statements such weight — and we've talked about this — as you

feel they deserve in light of the evidence. You determine the weight, how important is what you are considering. And, you know, you get to that, too, by respecting each other and your opinions, and your discussions will -- you know they should be open. Just let everybody say their piece and get to where you have to resolve these fact issues, the credibility of the witnesses, whether the sufficiency satisfies the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

You know, you had witnesses of all kinds in here. Some were federal and state law enforcement officers, EPA, DEC, et cetera, et cetera. And the fact that any of those witnesses may be employed by the federal or state government as a law enforcement official, that in and of itself does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness.

At the same time, it is quite legitimate for the defense to try to attack the credibility of law enforcement witnesses on the grounds that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case.

It is your decision, after reviewing all the

evidence, whether to accept the testimony of the law enforcement witnesses and to give that testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves.

Okay. Now, we're still -- credibility, you've heard terms of, you know, contradictions in testimony or statements or impeachment. And in this case there was evidence that a witness may have made a statement on an earlier occasion, which maybe tomorrow you'll hear the attorneys argue is inconsistent with that witness's trial testimony.

Keep this in mind: Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, okay, something that was different than what was testified to in trial, is not to be considered by you -- and this is part of that instruction, okay -- as affirmative evidence bearing on the guilt of the defendants.

And that sounds a little complicated, but it's not. What that really means is evidence of prior inconsistent statements was placed before you for the more limited purpose of helping you decide whether to believe — that is the credibility — the trial testimony of the witness who contradict himself or herself. If you find that a witness made an earlier statement that conflicts with his

or her trial testimony, you may consider that fact in deciding how much of that witness's testimony, if any, to believe.

Now, in making that determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a false statement or whether it was an innocent mistake; whether the inconsistency concerns an important fact or whether it had to do with a small detail; whether the witness had an explanation for the inconsistency, and whether that explanation appealed to your common sense. Common sense, right? I mean, it kind of works into everything.

It is exclusively your duty, based upon all the evidence and your own good judgment, to determine whether the prior statement was, in fact, inconsistent and, if so, how much, if any, weight to be given to the inconsistent statement in determining whether to believe all or part of the witness's testimony.

Again, in evaluating the believability or the credibility of the witnesses, you should take into account any evidence that the witness who testified may benefit in some way from the outcome of this case. Such an outcome in the -- or interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify

falsely and may sway the witness to testify in a way that advances that witness's own interest.

So, therefore, if you find that any witness whose testimony you are considering may have an interest in the outcome of this trial, then you should bear that factor in mind when evaluating the credibility of his or her testimony, and -- what? -- you accept it with great care, because there are interests that might come into play.

That's not to suggest to you that every witness who has an interest in the outcome of a case will testify falsely. That's simply not the case. It is for you to decide to what extent, if at all, the witness's interest has affected or colored his or her testimony.

In connection with your evaluation of the believability of the witnesses, you should specifically consider evidence of resentment or anger which some government witnesses may have toward the defendants. Evidence that a witness is biased, prejudiced, or hostile towards the defendants requires you to view that witness's testimony with caution, to weigh it with care, and subject it to close and searching scrutiny.

Now, although the defendants are under

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indictment, right, you should remember and you must remember that an indictment is only an accusation.

It is not by any stretch evidence.

The defendants have pleaded not guilty to each count of the indictment, and as a result of their pleas of not guilty, once again, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable You've heard me say this countless times. The burden never shifts to the defendants, for the simple reason that the law never imposes upon the defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence. The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of all charges against him, or it, and I therefore instruct you that the defendants are to be presumed by you to be innocent throughout your deliberations until such time, if ever, you as a jury are satisfied that the government has proven either or both defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, the defendants begin the trial with a clean slate. That presumption of innocence is that clean slate, and it alone is sufficient -- the presumption of innocence is alone sufficient to acquit a defendant, to find him or it not guilty, unless you as jurors are unanimously convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in this case.

If the government fails to sustain its burden -- what? -- you must find the defendants not guilty. The presumption was with the defendants when the trial began, and remains with them even now as I speak to you, and will continue with the defendants into your deliberations unless and until you are convinced that the government has proven their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's just talk about that, because you've heard me say that so many times. Beyond a reasonable doubt. That's what the government must prove. Okay. So what is a reasonable doubt? Well, again, using common sense, experience, intelligence, those words virtually define themselves.

Beyond a reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense. Beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

must therefore be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.

Now, again, that's what reasonable doubt is, but it is not a caprice or a whim. It is not speculation. It is not suspicion. It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty, and also it is not sympathy. Right?

So you've got the definition. Beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a criminal case the burden is at all times upon the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. That's not the standard. It's beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict. That burden -- you've heard me say this so many times -- never shifts to the defendants, which means that it is always the government's burden to prove each of the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. And, ladies and gentlemen, if after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence you

have a reasonable doubt, then what's your duty? Your duty is to acquit.

On the other hand, if after -- and we insist on this, and you know we're talking about a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are satisfied of the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, what should you do? You should vote to convict.

Now, you know that in this case the defendant

Mark Kamholz did not testify in this case, and

under our constitution, yours and mine, he has no

obligation to testify or present any other

evidence, because it is the prosecution's burden to

prove the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. That burden stays with the prosecution,

through the entire trial, never shifts. The

defendants are never required to prove that they

are innocent.

They have both entered not guilty pleas. You may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant Mark Kamholz did not testify. No adverse inference against him may be drawn by you because he did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against him in any way in your deliberations in the jury room.

Now, I've talked about Mark Kamholz, and the other defendant, as you know, is the Tonawanda Coke Corporation. And it is a corporation, and under the constitution and laws of this country a corporation is a person under the law and may be found guilty of an offense charged. Of course, a corporation, again fundamentally, is not a human being, and as such, a corporation acts only through its agents and employees. That is, by those officers, agents, employees, or other persons authorized or employed to act for it. The agents of a corporation include its officers, directors, employees, and certain others who are authorized to act for it.

A corporate defendant, here Tonawanda Coke, is entitled to the same impartial consideration of the evidence that you must give to a human being defendant such as Mark Kamholz. A corporation may be found guilty of the offense charged or be found not guilty of this offense charged under the same instructions that apply to a human being defendant. Common sense, right? Beyond a reasonable doubt.

To sustain its burden of proof on any charge as to Tonawanda Coke, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following:

First, the offense charged was committed by agents or employees of the Tonawanda Coke
Corporation.

Second, the acts by the agents or employees were committed within the authority or scope of their employment.

And third, in committing the offense, the agents or employees of Tonawanda Coke intended at least in part to benefit the defendant corporation.

For an act to be within the authority of an agent or the scope of the employment of an employee, it must deal with a matter that's performance is generally entrusted to the agent or employee by the defendant corporation.

It is not necessary that the particular act was itself authorized or directed by Tonawanda Coke.

If an agent or an employee was acting within the scope of their authority or employment and at least in part for the benefit of the company, Tonawanda Coke is not relieved of its responsibility because the act was illegal, contrary to its instructions, or against its general policies. You may, however, consider the existence of Tonawanda Coke's policies and instructions and the diligence of its efforts to enforce them in determining whether the agents

or employees were acting with intent to benefit

Tonawanda Coke or within the scope of their

employment and at least in part for Tonawanda

Coke's benefit.

Now, a person may be found guilty of a violation of the Clean Air Act or the Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act, RCRA, as a responsible corporate officer if the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that, first, the person had actual knowledge of the facts that give rise to the violation; second, that the person had the authority and capacity to prevent the violation; and third, that the person failed to prevent the violation.

Okay. Heard enough? Okay. We're going stop there. Okay. We're going to talk tomorrow about the indictment that contains the charges against the defendants. I'll be reminding you that the indictment is not evidence. It's an accusation. It describes the charges. It's not to be considered as evidence.

So in reaching that determination, you just, from your standpoint, have to resolve whether the defendants' guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and consider only the evidence or

lack of evidence that has been given to you in this case.

You know, I think it's enough. You've got a lot to absorb. You've had somewhat of a long day. But we're going make sure you get rested tomorrow, and then we'll start at noonish. And we'll have the closing arguments tomorrow, and they should wrap up, and then, you know, I'll go into some more explicit details with respect to those elements and definitions and each count to be considered separately.

And, you know, you have blocks of counts of the indictment that relate to, you know, the Clean Air Act or the RCRA or -- and that kind of thing. So, you know, we'll get into that tomorrow. And then you'll start your work, and you'll get these fact issues resolved. And I'm confident that you'll come through with what you promised, that you would do your very best to reach a unanimous verdict on all the counts in the indictment here, starting probably tomorrow when you get the case for your deliberations. Okay.

Look at this. You've got 20 minutes, an early quit for the day. How much better can it get than that?

1 Thank you very much. Don't discuss the case. 2 Keep your minds open. Don't do any independent 3 research. 4 From the attorneys' standpoint, did I miss 5 anything that I should be addressing? 6 MR. MANGO: No, your Honor. 7 MR. LINSIN: No. We're satisfied, your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. PERSONIUS: No, your Honor. Thank 11 you. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you sincerely. 13 You know, keep all the stuff in your head. It will 14 all coalesce; it will all work out. We'll see you 15 tomorrow at what time? 16 THE JURY: Noon. 17 THE COURT: 12:00 o'clock. Okay. And 18 thank you very much. 19 (Jury excused from the courtroom.) 20 THE COURT: Okay. Tomorrow at 9:30 we'll 21 have the charge conference. We'll get that set as 22 quickly as we can, give you time to get geared up. 23 MR. LINSIN: Okay. 24 THE COURT: Okay? 25 MR. MANGO: All right.

THE COURT: And you want to handle -- the attorneys have to sign off on the exhibit list.

THE CLERK: Yeah. And it will have to be done then after -- unless you're ready to give me the exhibits now, it will have to be done after closings but before the final charge. Because the exhibits have to be ready to go to the jury as soon as the judge finishes the charge.

THE COURT: Right. I know the paralegals have been working and are very comfortable with where we're at, but it requires the attorneys to sign off. And Colleen will take over tomorrow for Mary. She has been fully advised, and she'll be the one responsible for getting the list, the exhibits, the charge and everything to the jury. But I like to get it as promptly after the finality of the charge to the jury so that they can get right into the deliberations. Okay?

MR. MANGO: Good.

THE COURT: So review what you have to tonight with your paralegals. Make sure that you don't have any issues as far as the exhibits.

Thank you very much. We'll see you tomorrow at 9:30.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor.

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a Correct transcription of the proceedings Recorded by me in this matter. s/Michelle L. McLaughlin Michelle L. McLaughlin, RPR Official Reporter U.S.D.C., W.D.N.Y.